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Abstract 
This report describes the semi-aggregate model (SAM) developed to deliver aggregate 
projections of social protection expenditures as well as semi-aggregate projections of income 
sources by age class and gender for a number of European countries (Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Spain and United Kingdom) over 
the horizon 2005 - 2050. The partial equilibrium stance adopted allows both a greater flexibility 
in the choice of countries and in the building of scenarios, while at the same time offering an 
easier understanding of the model’s inner mechanisms with respect to general equilibrium 
modelling. Results for aggregate projections are presented, including various sensitivity 
scenarios devoted at analysing the role of theoretical replacement rates and employment rates – 
such as the one necessary to fulfil the Lisbon targets – on public pensions expenditures. 
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for Social Expenditure Projections 
ENEPRI Research Report No. 62/January 2009 
Pier Marco Ferraresi and Chiara Monticone 
1. Introduction 
CeRP’s Semi-Aggregate Model (SAM) is a highly stylised and simplified model meant to 
capture the effects of population ageing on both the labour market and the social protection 
expenditure within differently shaped welfare systems. It was developed mainly to deliver semi-
aggregate projections of income sources as an input for the computation of Comprehensive 
Replacement Rates (COREs, AIM WP9). In addition, it can deliver aggregate macroeconomic 
projections of social protection benefits and an indicator that will lead to important insights into 
the sustainability of social security systems in different countries.  
The relations between demographic and economic variables and their dynamics could be 
modelled within a general equilibrium approach, allowing for both the effects of demographic 
measures on economic ones and the parallel effects of economic variables on demographics, 
according to the kind of framing provided by the theory of endogenous family formation 
(Becker, 1960). The analytical complexity of general equilibrium models, however, requiring as 
they do the simultaneous modelling of different complex systems, does not allow us to 
disentangle simultaneous feedback effects. Thus, relying on a partial equilibrium framework 
strengthens our understanding of the direct effects of demography on the economy and on the 
budgetary consequences of different policy measures.  
Even within a partial equilibrium framework, an analysis of some specific issues has been 
performed, in particular: 
-  the effects of demographic dynamics on the structure of the labour supply, 
-  the effects of the changes in the structure of the labour supply on economic growth, 
-  the effects on the sustainability and adequacy of the welfare state of changes in the age 
composition of the population, in the labour supply and in economic growth.  
These objectives could also be reached by means of a microsimulation model. However, SAM 
has the advantage of avoiding the massive input requirements and complex modelling of 
microsimulation models, while at the same time providing fairly disaggregated projections with 
an understanding of the driving mechanisms. With respect to aggregate models, SAM uses data 
disaggregated by gender, 5-year age classes and labour market status (employed, unemployed, 
inactive). In addition, given the objective to perform a comparative analysis of different 
European countries, characterised by different welfare systems, the parameterisation of national 
economic and institutional features is quite stylised, in order to easily allow for the possible 
inclusion of new countries in the analysis.   
The approach is the same adopted by the Macro Economic Model already built and used by 
Soede et al. (2004).
1 This version of the model, however, is quite a radical modification and 
extension of the previous work, as shown in Appendix 1. 
                                                      
1 An earlier version of the model was also employed for simulations in the study “Implications of 
demographic change in enlarged EU on patterns of saving and consumption and in related consumer’s 
behaviour”, commissioned by the DG Employment and Social Affairs (DG Employment and Social 
Affairs, 2007). 2 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
The major driving force of the model is constituted by the demographic projections provided by 
Eurostat. The evolution of the age structure of the population – together with assumptions on 
participation rates and unemployment – affects the time composition of the labour supply. The 
resulting development of employment and an exogenously assumed productivity growth are the 
basis for the projection of economic growth. Income sources, including social benefits, evolve 
again in line with demography and labour productivity growth. Old-age pensions have been 
modelled more carefully than other benefits, taking into account already legislated reforms. 
Other benefits for the computation of comprehensive replacement rates include survivors’ 
pensions, invalidity and unemployment benefits, education, housing, family-related, and other 
social benefits according to the European classification adopted by the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) survey. Finally, projections of income, GDP and employment 
constitute the main ingredients for the computation of country-specific social protection benefits 
and expenditures up to 2050.  
All the main assumptions, such as those concerning labour productivity growth, participation 
rates and unemployment, are drawn from the European Commission projections (EPC-EC, 
2005), which provides a sound and comparable basis for the current exercise.  
As a result, the main outputs of SAM are projections of income sources (labour and capital 
income, and social benefits in cash) for the computation of COREs, aggregate social protection 
expenditures and an indicator of the pension system sustainability.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of modelling approaches in 
order to better define the ‘semi-aggregate’ methodology. Section 3 describes the model. Section 
4 highlights the hypotheses and illustrates baseline aggregate simulations. Section 5 shows 
hypotheses and results for a number of alternative scenarios. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The meaning of Semi-Aggregate 
The simulation approach as a support to policy-making is seeing rapid growth worldwide. With 
respect to social security, at least one simulation model has been developed in almost every 
country of the European Union (see Appendix 2). However, the models adopted in the various 
countries cannot be easily used to build a unified approach because the simulation approach 
differs greatly among them, with consequences in terms of data requirements, exogenous and 
endogenous variables and interpretation of results. In addition, these models were not in the first 
instance intended to produce a common set of indicators, even though they are now, following 
the Open Method of Coordination.  
As Table A2.1 (in Appendix 2) shows, in most cases the outputs are aggregate variables. This 
generates some difficulty in assessing the adequacy of pension systems, since, while the trends 
in pension expenditures are usually captured, the redistributive features of the systems as well as 
measures of pension wealth for representative subjects are not the main focus for most of these 
simulation models. 
2.1  Key choices in building a model 
Three key aspects may be considered to broadly classify the different simulation approaches: 
the time horizon, the degree of internal consistency of the approach, and the level of 
‘aggregation’ in the model. 
The time horizon allows us to distinguish among: 
-  static models that are interested in investigating the effects of reforms on current population 
within a short time interval (e.g. one year); 
-  static models aimed at performing comparative static analyses between two steady states; A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 3 
 
-  dynamic models, built to investigate not only the properties of steady states, but also the 
transition processes; they are also capable of estimating lifetime income and related 
variables. 
The degree of consistency. This issue may be addressed from three main perspectives: 
-  microeconomic consistency: does the model contain behavioural equations? Most of the 
models do not (a notable exception being the Auerbach-Kotlikoff kind of models) and 
substitute individual optimisation processes with reduced form equations, or simply with 
exogenous transition matrices; 
-  macroeconomic consistency, i.e. a general or a partial equilibrium model; the general 
equilibrium approach is particularly suitable to capture the effects of pension reforms on 
capital accumulation and labour supply as well as on factor prices. However, this normally 
comes at the cost of a loss in terms of institutional details. Moreover, even in general 
equilibrium models, due to the analytical difficulties (and the consequent need for numerical 
solutions), labour supply is frequently assumed to be inelastic, thus reducing the advantage 
of implementing a general equilibrium model, since the effects of social security reforms on 
labour supply cannot be assessed; 
-  demographic consistency: whenever more than one social security scheme is in place, for 
different categories of beneficiaries, from the point of view of sustainability demographic 
and occupational dynamics of different population subgroups cannot permanently diverge 
(and do not diverge in a steady state), although some occupations do disappear, while others 
temporarily expand and divergences may occur over a few decades. An institutional 
approach would consider the participants of each social security scheme separately, while a 
demographically consistent one would consider the whole population. The first approach 
can catch the effects of the dynamics of mortality rate, including specific probabilities of 
death, but cannot detect the variations in birth-rates and in migratory flows. A demographic 
model resumes these functions, but is less suitable for evaluating normative changes in a 
detailed way.  
The level of aggregation of the model refers to the minimum unit of analysis. Apart from 
aggregate projections, where calculations only refer to aggregate variables that are, in turn, 
obtained only as a function of other aggregate variables (e.g. aggregate pension expenditures 
and pension deficits as percentages of GDP), we can distinguish three levels of disaggregation:  
-  splitting by individuals and processes (agent-based simulations): each individual has a 
different history, because stochastic and behavioural processes are specific to the single 
agent. Agent-based modelling allows for the introduction of non-maximising behaviour 
(e.g., random or imitative behaviour), otherwise difficult to study. 
-  splitting by individuals (dynamic microsimulations): each individual is considered 
separately; the dynamics are obtained by applying a common stochastic process (instead of 
an individual-specific one, like in agent-based simulations) to each individual, in order to 
simulate a personal history. The approach preserves the maximum amount of heterogeneity 
but requires a long calculation time, like agent-based simulations. Moreover, since a Monte 
Carlo experiment must be applied to each single individual in order to change its status, the 
probability treatment is inefficient, in the sense that a small sample size generates a high 
variance in the results.  
-  splitting by groups (dynamic multistate simulations): individuals are grouped according to 
the different values assumed by given ‘state variables’ and their combinations (e.g. male-
married-workers, female-single-pensioners...). In order to add dynamics to the model, 
transition matrices are applied to move people from one group to another (e.g. male-
married-workers have a given probability of becoming male-divorced-unemployed). With 
respect to microsimulation, the advantages of this approach are reduced computational time 4 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
and a more efficient probability treatment of the groups. This is because shifting the 
individuals in each cell from one ‘state’ to another via the application of transition 
probabilities approximates the aggregate result of the application of individual stochastic 
processes to each person in the cell. The disadvantage is the loss of heterogeneity within 
each group.  
The approach we called “semi-aggregate” is a demographically-driven dynamic one, presenting 
some features of the multistate approach as well as some of the aggregate models. 
2.2  SAM: a Semi-Aggregate Model 
In a multistate approach (also named “cell-based” or macrosimulation approach), starting from a 
sample or a true population, individuals are aggregated in groups that are considered sufficiently 
homogeneous, through the following operations: i) the selection of relevant features of the 
population; ii) the homogenisation of the modalities that each of the relevant features can 
assume; iii) the transformation of some of the continuous ones (such as age) into discrete ones, 
by grouping them in classes. 
Each sample position (or ‘cell’) is thus defined by a number of characteristics (such as age, 
gender, occupational status etc.), and is characterised by a certain frequency (number of 
individuals pertaining to the cell) and by an average value of the variables under observation 
(such as income or pension).
2 The model evaluates the transition of individuals from one 
position to another by using matrices of transition probabilities. 
For SAM we adopted a ‘semi-aggregate’ approach. Without contradicting the multistate 
philosophy, the number of characteristics that determine each position is limited to three: age 
class, gender and labour market status (i.e. employed, unemployed, or out of the labour force). 
Moreover transition probabilities are not explicitly modelled and estimated; they are implicitly 
derived by the need to achieve consistency of the population structure with some assumed 
macroeconomic parameters, like unemployment, employment or participation rates.   
The institutional setting, like the pension rules, are sketched in a more simplified way with 
respect to multistate simulations, allowing for a large number of countries to be added to the 
analysis, without the need for modelling every single social security system in depth. 
3. Model  description 
The model delivers projections up to 2050 of public expenditure on pensions and other social 
benefits, and produces a sustainability indicator. Data for model parameterisation are derived 
mainly from cross-national studies, in particular ECHP and SHARE data constitute the main 
source of information, while Eurostat “Europop 2004” baseline forecast constitutes the 
demographic input. For each income or benefit category, the number of earners or recipients and 
the average amount in euro (at 2004 constant prices) are calculated, in a way consistent with the 
projected trend in the age profile of the population.  
Ten countries are covered in our simulation: Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK. Their populations amount to 80% of 
the EU25
3 total and about 75% that of the EU27. At the same time, the variety of countries 
accommodates different welfare regimes, thus allowing a comparison among them.  
                                                      
2 This model shares with multistate ones the shortcoming of having a loss of heterogeneity, since 
distributions may be considered across different classes but not within each of them.  
3 The selection of countries is partly carried out on a demographic basis for the report commissioned by 
DG Employment and Social Affairs (2007), and partly in order to represent different welfare regimes.  A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 5 
 
SAM is constituted by three modules: the Macroeconomic Framework module, the Income 
module, and the Benefits module. A stylised representation of the model is given in Figure 1, 
where the key relations between inputs (in the first row), the three modules (second row) and 
the main results (third row) are sketched. Before describing the model thoroughly, the data 
sources and the hypotheses used are briefly outlined.  
Figure 1. Stylised representation of the model 
 
3.1  Input sources and hypotheses  
Data sources for the various modules are collected in Table 1. The demographic projections are 
those provided by Eurostat (Europop 2004). Conservative assumptions regarding future 
migration flows are also included (EPC-EC, 2005). Projections for the main macroeconomic 
variables, such as participation rates, unemployment rate and labour productivity growth are 
drawn from the European Commission projections (EPC-EC, 2005) so as to provide a 
homogeneous and comparable basis. General unemployment rates and labour productivity 
growth rates used as inputs are shown in Tables 2 and 3 respectively.  6 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
The main semi-aggregate variables (namely, the amounts of income sources and the number of 
beneficiaries) are projected starting from ‘initial values’ computed on ECHP data. In particular, 
we computed population shares of income/benefits recipients and average amounts of 
income/benefits. In this last respect, it has to be remembered that ECHP income data on France 
are recorded gross of personal taxes. Consequently, other input data – namely replacement rates 
– for France are taken gross.  
The starting value of GDP is taken from Eurostat, where it is recorded in current euro also for 
the countries not participating in the single currency,
4 such as Denmark, Latvia, Poland and the 
UK. 
Further assumptions regarding interest rates, the share of income paid to capital and the cohort 
effects for consumption are collected in Table 4.  
Table 1. Data sources  
Variable Source 
Demographic projections by gender and age  Eurostat – Europop 2004 
Participation rates projections EPC-EC  (2005) 
Structural unemployment  EPC-EC (2005) 
Labour productivity growth  EPC-EC (2005) 
Number of earners by labour market status, gender and age  ECHP (2003) 
Net average income by age   ECHP (2003) 
Number of benefits recipients by labour market status, gender 
and age 
ECHP (2003) 
Net average benefits by age classes  ECHP (2003) 
Starting values of public debt to GDP and GDP (2004 
constant prices) 
Eurostat  
Nominal GDP used to update ECHP income data from 2000 
to 2004 
Eurostat  
Survival tables by country  Calculated on Eurostat 2003 data 
Starting years values of aggregate social expenditure  Eurostat (ESSPROS) and EC (2005) 
Rules on indexation mechanism for pensions  MISSOC tables (EC, 2006) 
Replacement ratios (I and II pillars) for new pensioners and 
their evolution. 
ISG-SPC (2006)  
Table 2. Unemployment rate assumptions 
  2003 2010 2015 2025 2050 
Denmark    5.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
France    9  8.3 7 7 7 
Germany    9.9  8.5 7 7 7 
Italy    8.9 7.3 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Latvia    10.7  7.6 7 7 7 
Luxembourg    3.7 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Netherlands  3.7 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Poland 20.1  15.8  12.9  7  7 
Spain    11.6  8.7 7 7 7 
United  Kingdom  5.1 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Source: EPC-EC (2005). 
                                                      
4 In the compilation of the euro/ECU series for all countries, non-euro currencies are converted at market 
exchange rates. (Eurostat, 2007).  A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 7 
 
Table 3. Labour productivity growth assumptions  
 2004-2010  2011-2030  2031-2050 
Denmark   1.9 1.8 1.7 
Germany   0.9  1.6  1.7 
Spain   1.1  1.9  1.7 
France 1.4  1.7  1.7 
Italy   0.7  1.7  1.7 
Luxembourg   1.8  1.9  1.7 
Netherlands   1.1  1.7  1.7 
United Kingdom   2.1  2.1  1.7 
Latvia   6.5  4.1  1.9 
Poland   3.8  3.1  1.9 
Source: EPC-EC (2005). 
Table 4. Baseline assumptions for economic projections 
Variable Assumption   
Interest rate (short term real )  2% for all countries and all periods  
Debt to GDP ratio  Constant for the whole projection period  
 
SAM is a single projection model, but it was designed to provide a unifying framework for 
economic projections of a large number of countries and a wide spectrum of social 
expenditures, including pensions, which are usually left to single country models, in 
consideration of the specific characteristics they assume in each country.  
As a consequence, simplifications are hardly avoidable, and they have been introduced 
depending on data availability for each single country. We may in particular distinguish three 
levels of gradually more ‘stylised’ projections; starting from the first, the higher level includes 
all the simplifications of the previous one, plus some more. Table 5 summarises the 
simplification levels by country. 
Projections should be interpreted keeping in mind that the higher the level of simplification, the 
more results assume the role of a picture of benchmark economies with a country-focused 
demographic evolution, and cannot be considered as reliable country-specific projections. This 
is especially true for Latvia and Poland, whose results deserve more caution.  
Table 5. Different simplification levels 
  Level 0  Level 1  Level 2 
Simplifying 
assumption 
with respect 
to lower level  
Baseline assumptions 
from Tables 1 and 2  
Hypotheses of Level 0 
+ 
Average instead of 
country-specific age-
consumption profile 
Hypotheses of Level 1 + 
ECHP data are missing, thus 
other countries’ average are 
applied. 
Unemployment level constant for 
all age classes for the first year. 
Average incomes rescaled
(1)   
Countries  France, Germany, 
Spain, Italy, 
Netherlands, Denmark 
Luxembourg, UK   Latvia, Poland 
(1) The average income by age class has been rescaled by the ratio between per capita GDP of the considered country 
and average per capita GDP of the whole cluster composed by countries belonging to lower simplification levels. 8 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
3.2  Macroeconomic framework  
The Macroeconomic module is aimed at projecting GDP growth and the development of 
employment. Exogenous variables for this module are: 
-  demographic projections by gender and age classes; 
-  participation rates by gender and age classes; 
-  structural unemployment rate; 
-  labour productivity growth; 
-  consumption profiles by age. 
The Eurostat demographic projections drive the economic projections through the interaction 
between the age structure of the population and the assumptions concerning the developments 
of the labour market. 
In particular, labour market participation rates by gender and age class, the level of total 
unemployment (i.e. for all age and gender classes), and the rate of growth of labour productivity 
(the ratio between output and employed workers), are taken from EPC-EC (2005), which 
delivers country-specific projections of these quantities up to 2050. 
The number of active people results directly from the exogenous input data:  
#ACTIVEt,g,a = #POPt,g,a * PART_RATEt,g,a (1) 
where #ACTIVEt,g,a is the number of active people of gender g, age class a at time t, #POPt,g,a is 
the number of people of gender g, age class a at time t, and PART_RATEt,g,a is the participation 
rate for individuals of gender g, age class a at time t. The number of unemployed individuals is 
derived by applying the unemployment rate to the number of active individuals. In each period t 
the unemployment rates by gender/age are computed scaling the 2004 unemployment rates 
proportionally so that they match the exogenous projections of the general unemployment rate 
(i.e. the unemployment rate projection not disaggregated by gender and age). Finally, the 
number of employed people by gender and age class is derived as a difference between the 
active and the unemployed at each time t.  
As an alternative to the methodology described above, the model also allows us to fix the 
exogenous employment rates to be reached in a given year. This is particularly useful to analyse 
the effect of labour market reforms such as the employment targets set in the Lisbon and 
Stockholm European Councils. In this case, participation rates are no longer exogenous, but are 
computed as a function of the target employment and unemployment rates. 
The annual growth of GDP is simply calculated as the sum of the annual growth of employment 
and of productivity.
5,6  
                                                      
5 This definition of GDP growth does not imply that other factors, in particular capital, are assumed to be 
irrelevant. The productivity of capital has not been explicitly considered because the estimation of the 
evolution of the capital stock in the economy is not our aim. However, since labour productivity is 
defined as GDP/Labour units, the definition of economic growth through the concept of labour 
productivity accounts for the role of capital and of total factor productivity in an indirect way. 
6 We also attempted a different methodology, whereby the rate of growth of GDP and the evolution of 
interest rates receives feedback from the ageing process. Even though this alternative procedure has not 
been used, it is described in Appendix 3.  A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 9 
 
3.3  The individual incomes 
The Incomes module projects the number of earners of wages, self-employed income and 
private income, as well as the average labour and capital income.  
Exogenous inputs to this module are: 
-  results from the Macroeconomic module. In particular, the number of employed, 
unemployed and inactive people by gender and 5-year age classes from 2004 to 2050; 
-  the proportion in the population of earners of wages, self-employment income and private 
income respectively, by labour market status, gender and age computed from ECHP 
database (as of 2000); 
-  net average incomes (wages, self-income, private income) at the beginning of the period by 
gender/age classes computed from ECHP database (as of 2000). 
As mentioned above, income sources are taken net of taxes, with the exception of France, 
because they are recorded so in ECHP and divided into three categories: i) wages and salaries; 
ii) self-employment income and iii) private income. These are described more in detail in Box 1. 
Results from the Macro-economic module include the number of employed, unemployed, and 
out of the labour market, for each age/gender class, for all the projection period. The ECHP 
dataset provides the number of wage earners by age/gender and employment status in 2000. The 
number of wage earners is projected by keeping the percentage of people earning a wage in a 
given class (determined by gender/age/labour market status) constant during the whole 
projection period. The same procedure is adopted for self-employed income and private income. 
Overlapping is allowed, however, since a wage earner may also be self-employed and/or receive 
a private income. As a consequence, the total number of income recipients is driven exclusively 
by the demographic evolution and not by modifications in the structure by 
age/gender/occupational status of the recipients over time. This hypothesis implies that the 
evolution of the number of earners in each age/gender/labour market group does not affect the 
overall number of earners, since this is only determined by demographic factors.  
The evolution of the number of wage earners is in detail:  
WEt,g,a= (%WE2000,empl,g,a * #emplt,g,a) + 
+ (%WE2000,unempl,g,a * #unemplt,g,a) + 
+ (%WE2000,inact,g,a * #inactt,g,a), 
(2)
where WEt,g,a is the number of wage earners at time t, %WE2000,empl,g,a is the share of employed 
wage earners in the population (constant at 2000), %WE2000,unempl,g,a is the share of unemployed 
wage earners in the population (at 2000), %WE2000,inact,g,a is the share of inactive wage earners in 
the population (at 2000), and #emplt,g,a, #unemplt,g,a and #inactt,g,a are respectively the number of 
employed, unemployed and inactive people at each time t. As a matter of fact there should be no 
wage earners among the unemployed and the inactive. However, since this discrepancy results 
directly from the ECHP micro data and the number of unemployed and inactive earning a labour 
income is very small, we included them in the computations.  
The evolution of the number of self-employed and private income earners is analogously 
determined.  
The average amount of each income component (wage, self-employed income and private 
income) is taken from ECHP at its 2000 level and then it is updated to the year 2004 using 
nominal GDP to be consistent with the macroeconomic inputs, whose starting level is at the 
2004 value. All income sources are assumed to grow for each age/gender class according to 
labour productivity. For instance, the evolution of wages follows this pattern: 10 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
wt,g,a = wt-1,g,a * (1+jt),   (3) 
where wt,g,a is the wage at time t, wt,g,a in the first year of the projections is the average 2000 
wage from ECHP (updated to 2004 with nominal GDP) and jt  is the growth of labour 
productivity. Each wt,g,a is computed for every gender g and age class a, whereas jt is constant 
over age and gender but varies over time. 
This implies that the overall average income amounts (i.e. the average of all age/gender classes) 
grows at a rate that is a function both of the assumed labour productivity growth and of the 
age/gender structure of earners. For private income, growth is assumed to be the same as 
household income; this avoids income shares converging to zero/one in the long-run. The 
overall wage bill by gender/age at time t (WBt,g,a) is thus:  
WBt,g,a = WEt,g,a * wt,g,a (4) 
The overall self-income and private income bills are computed analogously.  
Box 1. Income sources (ECHP classification) 
Income sources are derived directly from ECHP data, with no adjustment on our part. 
Wages and salaries 
Normal income from work as an employee or apprentice and additional earnings from overtime, 
commission or tips. Additional payments (13
th and 14
th month’s salary), holiday pay or allowance, 
profit-sharing bonus, other lump-sum payments and company shares are also covered. 
Self-employed income 
Data on income from a person’s own business, profession or farm are gathered as the pre-tax 
profit, i.e. the profit after deducting all expenses and wages paid, but before deducting tax or 
funds withdrawn for private use. This pre-tax profit is converted into net profit on the basis of a 
net/gross ratio. 
Private income 
-  Income from property: rental income after deducting mortgage, repairs, maintenance, 
insurance. The value before tax is converted into a net figure on the basis of a net/gross ratio. 
Data on income from property is gathered at household level and divided equally among all 
adult members (persons aged 16 or more) of the household. 
-  Capital income: Interest on savings certificates, bank deposits and dividend from shares. 
-  Private transfers: Any financial support or maintenance from relatives, friends or other 
persons outside the household. 
3.4  The projection of semi-aggregate social protection benefits 
The Benefits module delivers projections of the number of (non-old age) social benefits 
recipients, the average value of the benefits over time and the corresponding expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP. Old-age pension benefits and recipients are computed in this module but 
will be described in the next section. This module provides two sets of results:  
-  The projection of net
7 social protection cash benefits semi-aggregated by age/gender to 
serve as an input for COREs; 
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-  The projection of aggregate social protection benefits. 
Exogenous inputs are: 
-  results from the previous modules, in particular the number of employed, unemployed and 
inactive people by gender and 5-year age classes from 2004 to 2050; 
-  number of benefits recipients by labour market status, gender and age class from ECHP 
database (as of 2000); 
-  net average benefits by gender/age classes as from ECHP database (as of 2000), and 
subsequent uprating. 
For the purpose of computing COREs, total disposable income is needed. The reference benefits 
used to construct total disposable income are those deriving from the ECHP survey. Benefit 
amounts collected in ECHP are limited to cash ones and are classified according to the 
categories displayed in Box 2 (EC-Eurostat, 2002). This classification is very comprehensive, as 
it includes not only personal benefits but also household-directed assistance (as in the case of 
housing and social allowances). Consequently, this data source proves a useful input for the 
computation of a disposable income measure needed for the analysis of Comprehensive 
Replacement Rates (COREs).   
For all the benefits mentioned above, with the exception of sickness/invalidity and old-age, the 
number of recipients is calculated following a procedure similar to the one adopted in the 
Incomes module. For each labour market status, the percentage of recipients of a particular 
benefit in a certain age-gender class is kept constant at its year 2000 level throughout the 
projected period. As mentioned above, this hypothesis implies that the overall number of 
recipients is only driven by demographic factors, because the population shares of recipients in 
each age/gender/working group remain constant over time. For instance, the number of 
recipients of benefit B is:  
BRt,g,a= (%BR2000,empl,g,a * #emplt,g,a) + 
+ (%BR2000,unempl,g,a * #unemplt,g,a) + 
+ (%BR2000,inact,g,a * #inactt,g,a), 
(5)
where BRt,g,a is the number of recipients of any specific benefit B at time t by gender/age, 
%BR2000,empl,g,a is the share of employed benefit recipients in the population (constant at 2000) 
and #emplt,g,a is the number of employed people by gender/age at each time t, etc. The evolution 
of the number of all benefit recipients is analogous, with the exception of sickness/invalidity 
and old-age pension beneficiaries.  
Consequently, the absolute number of recipients evolves according to the demographic and 
labour market projections. For example, population ageing is likely to reduce total number of 
family-related beneficiaries, since the percentage of people getting them is lower among the 
elderly. Similarly, the number of people on unemployment benefits if affected by the 
development of the labour market. Thus, their number shrinks whenever the Macroeconomic 
module projects a decrease of the unemployment rate.  
The average benefit in each category is assumed to increase, within each class, according to 
wage growth, that is with labour productivity. For instance, the evolution of the average benefit 
B for every gender/age class follows this rule: 
bt,g,a = bt-1,g,a * (1+jt),   (6) 
where  bt,g,a is the average benefit B by gender/age at time t,  bt,g,a in the first year of the 
projection is the average 2000 wage from ECHP (updated to 2004 with nominal GDP) and jt is 
the growth of labour productivity, depending only on time.  12 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
Box 2. Social protection benefits (ECHP classification, EC-Eurostat, 2002) 
Income sources are derived directly from ECHP data, with no adjustment on our part. 
Unemployment related benefits 
Component 1: Unemployment insurance benefit 
Component 2: Unemployment assistance 
Component 3: Training / retraining allowance 
Component 4: Placement, resettlement, and rehabilitation benefits 
Component 5: Other unemployment related benefits 
Pension or benefit relating to old-age or retirement  
Component 1: Old-age pension – Basic schemes (first pillar) 
Component 2: Old-age pension – Supplementary schemes (second pillar) 
Component 3: Old-age pension – Personal schemes (third pillar) 
Component 4: Old-age pension – Means-tested welfare schemes 
Component 5: Early retirement schemes 
Component 6: Other old-age related schemes or benefits 
Survivor's pension or benefits, that is, for widows or orphans 
Component 1: Widows pension – Basic schemes (first pillar) 
Component 2: Widows pension – Supplementary schemes (second pillar) 
Component 3: Widows pension – Personal schemes (third pillar) 
Component 4: Widows pension – Means-tested welfare schemes 
Component 5: Other widow's benefits 
Component 6: Orphan's pension / allowance 
Family related benefits, including maternity and single-parent benefits 
Component 1: Child allowance 
Component 2: Allowance for care of invalid dependants 
Component 3: Maternity allowance 
Component 4: Birth allowance 
Component 5: Unmarried mother's allowance 
Component 6: Deserted wife's allowance 
Component 7: Other family-related benefits 
Benefits relating to sickness or invalidity 
Component 1: Income maintenance benefits in case of sickness or injury 
Component 2: Other sickness benefits 
Component 3: Compensation for occupational accidents and diseases 
Component 4: Invalidity pension 
Component 5: Other invalidity benefits 
Education related allowances 
Scholarships, study grants 
Housing allowance 
Subsidies or other payments from public schemes to help meet housing costs. Data are gathered at 
household level and divided equally among all adult members (persons aged 16 or over) of the 
household. 
Social assistance 
Payments from the welfare office. Data are collected at household level and divided equally among all 
adult members (persons aged 16 or more) of the household. 
Any other personal social benefits 
Residual benefits not included in the above sub-categories. A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 13 
 
This methodology implies that the total expenditure on any benefit (i.e. over all age/gender 
classes) increases at a rate that is a function of both the wage growth and the age/gender 
structure of recipients. In the absence of a thorough modelling of each type of benefit, this 
seems a reasonable assumption for all the benefits other than old-age and sickness/invalidity 
benefits. Thus, the expenditure on benefit B is:   
,, ,,
,
(* ) tt g a t g a
ga
BE BR b =∑ ,   (7) 
where  BEt, is the expenditure on each benefit B at time t,  BRt,g,a is the number of benefit 
recipients – depending on demographic projections – and bt,g,a is the average benefit, growing at 
the projected rate of growth of labour productivity.  
For sickness/invalidity benefits, however, a somewhat different methodology is followed. In 
this case, the number of recipients is determined as a constant fraction of employed workers, 
instead of as a fraction of the overall population. The reason for this approach rests in the link 
between invalidity and employment: first, people are required to have been employed to be 
entitled to invalidity benefits; second, in many cases invalidity is related to features of the job 
(level of danger, unhealthy job conditions, and so on) or to accidents on the job; third, sickness 
benefits not related to work are a small fraction of cash benefits (public expenditure on sickness 
is mostly delivered in kind). The evolution of the number of invalidity beneficiaries is thus 
computed as:  
IRt,g,a = %IRempl2004 * (#IR2004,g,a/#IR2004) * #emplt,   (8) 
where IRt,g,a is the number of invalidity benefit recipients by age/gender at time t, %IRempl2004 is 
the share of people receiving invalidity benefits over the employed population in 2004 
(remaining constant throughout the whole projection period), #IR2004,g,a is the number of 
recipients by age and gender in 2004, #IR2004 is the total number of recipients over all age and 
gender classes in 2004, and #emplt is the total number of employed people over all age and 
gender classes at time t.  
The average sickness/invalidity benefit is assumed to grow with wages, as the other kinds of 
benefits.  
As for old-age pensions, given their importance in the overall welfare budget, benefits and 
beneficiaries are modelled through a specific sub-unit simulation, which deserves a lengthier 
explanation. 
3.5  Old-age pension projections (semi-aggregate cash benefits) 
As mentioned above, the exogenous inputs for the sub-module dedicated to old-age pensions 
are: 
-  results from the previous modules, in particular the number of employed, unemployed and 
inactive people by gender and 5-year age classes from 2004 to 2050; 
-  number of old-age benefit recipients by labour market status, gender and age class from 
ECHP database (as of 2000); 
-  net average old-age benefits by gender/age classes as from ECHP database (as of 2000), and 
subsequent uprating; 
-  rules on indexation mechanism for old-age pensions; 
-  net theoretical replacement rates from ISG-SPC (2006). 14 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
Starting from the number of pensioners, projections should, in principle, reflect the application 
of the eligibility rules to the changing demography, as well as the effect of incentives and of 
greater flexibility. Other relevant complications, however, mainly pertaining to the evolution of 
the labour market, cannot be dismissed. In particular, the European objective of increasing the 
employment rates of both the elderly and women will influence labour market performance, 
determining two opposing effects on the number of pensioners: while an increase in the 
employment rate of the elderly is going to reduce the number in the short run, the higher 
employment rate of women will increase it in the long run. 
The procedure adopted in the pension unit divides old-age pension recipients into two broad 
groups, the first constituted by the age classes we called ‘sensitive’, and the second constituted 
by ‘constant-ratio’ classes. The sensitive classes are constituted by old-age pension recipients 
aged 60 and over, who are assumed to be out of the labour force. The implicit assumption being 
made is that no one aged over 60 receiving an old-age pension is actively working. This is 
justified by the negligible number of pensioners older than 60 that are still in the labour force, 
and by the fact that reform efforts are usually addressed at increasing employment in the 50-60 
age groups, rather than at raising the employment rates of older individuals. Constant-ratio 
classes are constituted by people younger than 60. For this group no assumption about labour 
market participation is made, in order to include both pensioners not fully retired (that is, in the 
labour force, like partial retirees) and early retirees (that is, out of the labour force).  
The methodology for projecting benefits and beneficiaries of the a) constant-ratio classes and b) 
sensitive classes will be described in turn.  
a)  ‘Constant-ratio’ classes 
In the case of the constant-ratio group, the proportion of old-age pension recipients  by labour 
market status is projected analogously onto the number of recipients of non-pension benefits, 
that is, it is kept constant at the level of year 2000, as it was the case for all the other benefits. 
The reason for treating relatively young pension recipients in this unsophisticated way rests on 
the fact that a physiological number – however small – of retirees aged less than 60 will 
probably always exist (i.e. for the possibility of early retirement, industry restructuring, etc…). 
In this way the impact of any legislative change on the magnitude and age/gender structure of 
this group is neglected.   
Therefore, the number of pensioners in the constant-ratio group is:  
PR
(cr)
t,g,a= (%PR
(cr)
2000,empl,g,a * #empl
(cr)
t,g,a) + 
+ (%PR
(cr)
2000,unempl,g,a * #unempl
(cr)
t,g,a) + 
+ (%PR
(cr)
2000,inact,g,a * #inact
(cr)
t,g,a), 
(9)
where PR
(cr)
t,g,a is the number of pension recipients in the constant-ratio group at time t by 
gender/age, %PR
(cr)
2000,empl,g,a is the share of employed pension recipients in the constant-ratio 
group in the population (constant at 2000), #empl
(cr)
t,g,a is the number of employed people in the 
constant-ratio group by gender/age at each time t, etc.  
The pension benefit of the constant-ratio classes is projected in line with the average pension of 
recipients aged 60-64 (that is, the immediately older age class):  
() () ( 6 0 6 4 )
,, 1 ,, ,, *(1 )
cr cr
tga t ga tga pp k
−
− =+ ,   (10)
where p
(cr)
t,g,a is the average benefit of those in the constant-ratio group by gender/age at time t, 
p
(cr)
t,g,a in the first year of the projection is the average 2000 (updated to 2004 with nominal A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 15 
 
GDP) old -age pension of those in the constant-ratio group by gender/age from ECHP 
and
(60 64)
,, tga k
− is the rate of growth of the average pension of those in the age class 60-64. 
It is worth noting that the average pension includes not only the public pension, but also the 
supplementary (second pillar) and personal (third pillar) schemes, consistently with ECHP 
definitions recalled above.  
b)  ‘Sensitive’ classes  
The number of pensioners within the sensitive classes and their average pension are projected in 
a more refined way. The projection procedure for the number of retirees can be summarised by 
referring to three elements: 
-  the stock of existing pensioners in each period; 
-  the flow of ‘new’ pensioners; 
-  the number of pensioners dying in each period. 
As the projection of the number of new pensioners is done by 5 year age-brackets and 5 year-
intervals, the number of pensioners aged 60+ at time t is determined by adding to the stock of 
pensioners at time t-5 the flow of new pensioners, and subtracting pensioners that die between t-
5 and t. The demographic projections drawn from Eurostat are used to compute survival 
probabilities that allow us to determine the number of surviving pensioners in each age class 
and year.
8 Projections with constant – at 2004 – survival rates will be also provided in order to 
allow comparisons. Tables comparing the number of pensioners obtained with constant and 
‘evolving’ life tables are collected in Appendix 5.   
Two hypotheses are made in this computation:  
-  there are no active people aged 65 or over, so that all individuals alive after 65 are retired;  
-  there are no ‘new’ pensioners aged 70 or over. This derives from the first assumption (since 
the projection of pensioners’ number is done in 5 year-intervals, if no one is in the labour 
force at 65, no one retires at 70). 
The following rule describes the computation of the number of new pensioners: 
(60 64)
( 5 55 9 ) ( 6 06 4 ) ( 5 55 9 ) ( 5 55 9 )
5( 6 0 6 4 ) 5
(55 59) (55 59) (60 64)
5( 6 0 6 4 )
#
(1 )
t
tt t
tt
NP
LF LF LF
LF LF
ω
ω
−
−− − −
−− −
−− −
−−
=
=−− − ×=
=−
   (11)
where 
(60 64) # t NP
−  are the new pensioners, at time t, exiting from the labour force within the age 
bracket 60-64, while LF indicates the labour force at a given time and age class and 
(55 59)
(60 64) ω
−
−  is 
the 5 year-survival rate between age class 55-59 and age class 60-64 and between t and t+5. 
Thus the number of new pensioners in the age bracket 60-64 is equal to those who were active 5 
years before when they were aged 55-59, minus those active now (at 60-64) and those that died 
in the meantime.  
                                                      
8 The demographic projections used to compute life tables are those contained in the ‘no migration’ 
variant. This variant is particularly useful since it adopts the same parameters – fertility and life 
expectancy – as the baseline variant but assumes no migration.  16 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
For new pensioners exiting from the labour force within the age bracket 65-69 an analogous rule 
is followed:  
(65 69) (60 64) (60 64)
5( 6 5 6 9 ) # tt NP LF ω
−− −
−− =× ,  (12)
but – as mentioned – it is assumed that there are no active individuals in the age bracket 65-69 
or subsequent ones. Remaining age classes (70+) do not explicitly originate new pensioners in 
the model:  
(70 ) #0 t NP
+ = .  (13)
The evolution of existing pensioners aged 60+ is projected by 5 year-intervals and 5 years age 
brackets, then a linear interpolation is used to smooth the curve, generating approximate 
projections by intervals of 1 year. 
The average pension of ‘sensitive classes’ pensioners includes – again – public pension and 
supplementary (second and third pillar) schemes, as from ECHP. Even though the pension 
formulae of each country are not explicitly modelled, some link to the already legislated reforms 
is embedded in the replacement ratio and the pension indexation mechanism. In each period t, 
the average pension is determined as a weighted average of:  
a) the pension earned by pensioners (old and new) already existing at time t-1, and  
b) the pension calculated for new pensioners. 
The latter (b) is computed by multiplying the average wage of the age class a-5 at time t-1 by 
the replacement ratio. The evolution of replacement ratios over the whole projection period is 
taken exogenously. Target replacement ratios for new pensioners are set to be reached in a 
linear fashion by 2050. In the baseline and alternative scenarios the replacement rates for public 
and private pensions are those provided by the Indicators Sub-Group of the Social Protection 
Committee (ISG-SPC, 2006). It has to be noted, however, that the baseline replacement rates 
refer to individuals with a continuous career, thus they may not provide an accurate 
representation of the average individual. Replacement ratios are collected in Appendix 4.  
The formula to compute the average pension of sensitive classes is as follows:  
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(14)
where 
()
,,
sens
tga p is the average pension of sensitive classes at time t for each age/ gender class, and 
()
,,
sens
tga p in the first year of the projection are the ECHP values for 2000 updated at 2004 with 
nominal GDP growth. 
()
,, #
sens
tga OP  and 
()
,, #
sens
tga NP are the numbers of old and new pensioners 
respectively at time t for each age/ gender class, π is the percentage of price indexation 
(constant for the whole projection period),  ,, 5 tga w − is the wage growth from t-1 to t in the age 
class 5 years younger,  t RR is the replacement rate at time t, and  ,, 5 tga W − is the wage level in the A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 17 
 
age class 5 years younger. The term
1, , 5 , , 5
2
tg a t g a WW − −− +
captures at the same time the wage level 
in the age class a-5 and the wage growth between time  t-1 and t.  
For the countries where there is full indexation of pensions to prices (π=1) equation 14 boils 
down to:  
() () ()
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.  (15)
On the contrary, for the countries where there is full indexation to wages (π=0) equation 14 
above boils down to:  
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Finally, the total old-age pension expenditure (in cash) is obtained as the sum of semi-aggregate 
values by gender/age:  
(cr) (sens) (cr) (cr) (sens) (sens)
t t,g,a t,g,a t,g,a t,g,a t,g,a t,g,a t,g,a
g,a g,a g,a
PE =  PE  =  (PE  + PE ) =  (#P  * p  + #P  * p )  ∑∑ ∑   (17)
where PEt, is the total pension expenditure (in cash) at time t, 
(cr)
t,g,a #P  is the number of pensioners 
aged less than 60 by age/gender, 
(cr)
t,g,a p is the average pension benefit of pensioners aged less 
than 60 by age/gender, 
(sens)
t,g,a #P is the number of pensioners aged 60 and over by age/gender, and 
(sens)
t,g,a p is the average pension benefit of pensioners aged 60 and over by age/gender. 
3.6  Aggregate social protection expenditure projections 
Total social expenditure can be computed as the product of the number of recipients times the 
average amount of each benefit, as shown above in Equations 7, 8 and 17. However, those 
projected figures are not suitable to obtain the expenditure as a percentage of GDP, even though 
they are suitable to compute COREs, because of the underestimation of the average amounts 
provided by ECHP with respect to national statistics.
9  
Therefore, in order to obtain a measure of the evolution of aggregate public expenditure in 
social protection and have an insight into the model ability to deliver macroeconomic 
projections, the dynamics of semi-aggregate public expenditures (i.e. those derived in Equations 
7, 8 and 17) is applied to the 2004 level of aggregate social expenditures drawn from official 
statistics.  
In our case, the starting (i.e. 2004) levels of aggregate social expenditure can be taken from two 
sources. The differences between the chosen input data are described here:  
                                                      
9 This is mainly due to the fact that ECHP figures are net of taxes and of administration costs, but they 
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1)  First, we took starting levels from Eurostat data, classified according to ESSPROS 
depending on their function and their type (i.e. cash or kind) (EC-Eurostat, 1996). In this 
dataset, “social protection encompasses all interventions from public or private bodies 
intended to relieve households and individuals of the burden of a defined set of risks or 
needs, provided that there is neither a simultaneous reciprocal nor an individual 
arrangement involved” (EC-Eurostat, 2006, p. 12). For a more detailed description of this 
classification see Box 3. It is important to note that: i) expenditure from public and private 
bodies is not disentangled, therefore these aggregate starting values will grow in line with 
both public and private semi-aggregate expenditures;  ii) on the contrary, in-cash and in-
kind benefits can be disaggregated, so we will use cash benefits only, since in-kind benefits 
are not explicitly modelled in SAM. Point ii) implies that the evolution with respect to GDP 
of aggregate expenditures might not be directly comparable with official statistics about 
total public social expenditure. This is especially true for the benefits delivered mostly in 
kind, such as health care (see Table 6 below).  
2)  Second, we drew starting levels from EC (2005) where the 2004 level of public pension 
expenditure with respect to GDP is provided. It is worth noting that: i) these data refer to 
public expenditures only, so they are made to grow in line with semi-aggregate public 
expenditures; ii) these data exclude private pension provisions, but they include public old-
age and early retirement pensions as well as disability and widow’s pensions, so the figures 
might turn out higher than those produced using starting levels from ESSPROS (described 
under point 1 above).  
As a remark, the projections used as an input for COREs are directly taken from semi-aggregate 
expenditures computed in Equations 7, 8 and 17, and, as for old-age pensions, they include both 
public and private pensions.  
Box 3. Social protection expenditure (ESSPROS classification, EC-Eurostat, 1996) 
Sickness/Health care 
Income maintenance and support in cash in connection with physical or mental illness, excluding 
disability. Health care ended to maintain, restore or improve the health of the people protected 
irrespective of the origin of the disorder. 
Disability 
Income maintenance and support in cash or kind (except health care) in connection with the inability of 
physically or mentally disabled people to engage in economic and social activities. 
Old age 
Income maintenance and support in cash or kind (except health care) in connection with old age. 
Survivors 
Income maintenance and support in cash or kind in connection with the death of a family member. 
Family/children 
Support in cash or kind (except health care) in connection with the costs of pregnancy, childbirth and 
adoption, bringing up children and caring for other family members. 
Unemployment 
Income maintenance and support in cash or kind in connection with unemployment. 
Housing 
Help towards the cost of housing. 
Social exclusion not elsewhere classified 
Benefits in cash or kind (except health care) specifically intended to combat social exclusion where 
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Table 6. Social protection benefits, by function and type, 2004, as % GDP* 
 
Sickness/ 
Health care  Invalidity Old  age Survivors 
  In cash  In kind  In cash  In kind  In cash  In kind  In cash  In kind 
Denmark  1 5.1 2.9 1.3 9.2 1.9  0  0 
Germany  1.4 6.3 1.6 0.6  11.8 0.2 0.4  0 
Spain  1.1 4.9 1.3 0.2 7.6 0.4 0.6  0 
France  0.7  8 1.2 0.5  10.6 0.3 1.9  0 
Italy  0.5  6 1.5 0.1  12.8 0.1 2.5  0 
Latvia  0.5 2.5 0.9 0.3 5.7 0.1 0.3  0 
Luxembourg  0.8 4.7  2  1 5.8  0 2.3  0 
Netherlands  2.2 5.9 2.7 0.2 8.8 0.9 1.4  0 
Poland  0.7 3.1 2.2  0  10.8  0 0.9  0 
United  Kingdom  0.6 7.2 1.9 0.4  10.1 0.6 0.9  0 
  Family/Children Unemployment  Housing  Social exclusion 
n.e.c. 
  In cash  In kind  In cash  In kind  In cash  In kind  In cash  In kind 
Denmark  1.6 2.3 2.7 0.1  - 0.7 0.8 0.2 
Germany  2.2 0.7 2.2 0.3  - 0.2 0.4  0 
Spain  0.4 0.3 2.3 0.2  - 0.2  0 0.1 
France  2 0.5 2.2  0  - 0.8 0.4  0 
Italy  0.7  0.5  0.5 0 - 0 0 0 
Latvia  1 0.2 0.4  0  - 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Luxembourg  3.3 0.6  1  0  - 0.2 0.4 0.1 
Netherlands  0.7 0.5 1.7  0  - 0.3 0.5 0.8 
Poland  0.9 -  0.7 0 - -  0.1  0.1 
United  Kingdom  1.3 0.4 0.5 0.2  - 1.5 0.1 0.1 
* ESSPROS definition. 
Source: Eurostat. 
3.7  An indicator of social security sustainability 
Given the model’s focus on adequacy measures, it does not provide a sustainability analysis 
based on the government’s budget constraint. However, the model can compute a notional 
payroll tax rate for pensions, which represent the most relevant fraction of social benefits. Even 
though the financial sustainability of the pension system is not determined only by the taxation 
of wages or self-employment income, this notional rate captures the quota of aggregate income 
that is devoted to pension expenditure. This indicator can also be compared with the effective 
payroll tax rates in force in every country to gain an insight into the burden of ageing on public 
finances.  
The exogenous inputs for this sub-module are: 
-  Old-age pension expenditure from Equation 17 and income bill (wages plus self-
employment income) from Equation 4 et sim.; 
-  Hypotheses on the constancy of public debt with respect to GDP and on interest rates 
(assumed to be constant at 2% for all countries).  20 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
The notional equilibrium payroll tax rate is defined as the average contribution rate which 
should be levied on the wages and the self-employed income to finance the payments of 
pensions:
10 
t
t
tt
PE
WB SB
ϑ =
+
,  (18)
where ϑt is the notional payroll tax rate, PEt is the pension expenditure at time t (from Equation 
17), WBt is the wage bill at time t and SBt is the self-employment income bill at time t 
(Equation 4).  
In addition, the government debt may be considered in the analysis, since a high debt reduces 
the room for deficits in the public pension system. Thus, a correction can be applied to take into 
account the interest payments on government debt. The rationale for this is that a higher level of 
debt increases the burden of public finances and reduces the government’s possibility to require 
additional effort (in terms of social contributions) to finance current pensions. In practice, an 
additional component is added to the numerator by summing part of the service of the debt to 
public pension expenditure.  
Not all the debt, of course, is generated by the need to cover pension deficits. As a consequence 
a rule of thumb is applied, and the cost of debt is corrected for the ratio between pension 
expenditure and the overall social expenditure, as a proxy of the fraction of debt imputable to 
past pension deficits. Furthermore, since it is assumed here that the government debt is a 
constant fraction of GDP and, holding a balanced budget, such a fraction would decrease when 
a country pays the total service, countries can finance part of their service by extra borrowing, 
and not all the service of the debt is bound to go to the detriment of the contribution rate.
11 
Therefore, an alternative measure of the sustainability indicator is:  
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(19)
where servt is the debt service at time t,  t debt Δ is annual increase in debt that the country can 
afford maintaining the debt/GDP ratio constant (that is, since GDP grows also debt can grow in 
absolute terms), PEt is the public pension expenditure and TOTEt is the overall social protection 
expenditure.  
Of course this method, given the partial equilibrium approach that has been adopted, does not 
prevent the ‘notional contribution rate’ from becoming unsustainable. On the contrary, an 
unsustainable path would require active policies. Moreover, increases in the equilibrium payroll 
                                                      
10 A note of caution must be added: social security schemes of employed and self-employed workers are 
different in many countries; the notional equilibrium contribution rate, however, is an average 
sustainability indicator, it is not aimed at distinguishing among different pension regimes, but only at 
determining how much the overall labour income bill should be taxed to pay the overall pension 
expenditure; as a consequence the indicator is not differentiated between a wage and a self-income 
contribution rates.    
11 The service of the government debt is computed with a 2% constant real interest. Moreover, interest 
rates are corrected for the effects of ageing on consumption, through the use of the production function, as 
explained more extensively in Appendix 3. A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 21 
 
tax rates should be read as an encouragement to increase contribution rates – as this would 
hardly be feasible – but rather as an indicator of the sustainability evolution.  
A further note of caution in reading the results is needed. Since as all the income values used to 
compute social expenditure and the wage bill are net of taxes, so the notional payroll tax rate 
suffers from this shortcoming too. 
4. Baseline  projections:  hypotheses and results  
The simulation framework just described is meant to answer a range of questions about the 
effects of ageing on the sustainability and adequacy of social security systems. In order to 
investigate these topics, we will first describe baseline projections, while subsequent sections 
will be devoted to illustrate new scenarios.  
The baseline scenario is built using:  
-  ‘endogenous’ employment rates (i.e. as resulting from participation and unemployment 
exogenous projections and without reaching Lisbon targets);  
-  the baseline variant of demographic projections;  
-  replacement rates referring to a representative individual earnings 100% of mean national 
income.  
4.1  Demography and macroeconomics  
This section presents demographic and macroeconomic projections, obtained according to the 
methodology described in Section 3.2, for the baseline scenario. Table 7 shows old-age 
dependency rates computed on the demographic projections (exogenous inputs to the model). 
Italy and Spain, among the countries considered, have the highest ratio at the end of the period.  
Table 7. Old-age dependency rates, % 
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    22.6 24.8 31.2 37.1 42.1 40.0 
France  25.3 25.9 33.2 40.7 46.9 47.9 
Germany    27.8 31.0 35.1 46.0 54.6 55.8 
Italy    29.4 31.3 36.6 45.2 59.8 66.0 
Latvia   24.1  25.2  28.0 33.4 37.4 44.1 
Luxembourg    21.2 21.6 24.7 31.5 36.7 36.1 
Netherlands    20.7 22.2 29.0 36.7 41.6 38.6 
Poland   18.7  18.8  27.1 35.7 39.7 51.0 
Spain    24.5 25.4 30.0 38.9 54.3 67.5 
United Kingdom   24.4  25.1  30.3  37.4  43.8  45.3 
Source: our computation on Eurostat data. 
Note: computed as population 65+/population 15-64. 
Table 8 presents growth rates in GDP and GDP per capita respectively. There is a slowdown on 
growth for all countries. In particular, growth rates decrease substantially for Poland and Latvia, 
showing a convergence with the EU-15 around the 2020s and 2030s. Moreover, Table 8 shows, 
with only a few exceptions, that GDP per capita growth rates become larger than overall growth 
rates by the end of the projection. GDP per capital levels are collected in Table 9. 
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Table 8. GDP growth rate, period average, % 
  2005-2010 2011-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050 
    Per 
capita 
  Per 
capita
  Per 
capita
  Per 
capita 
  Per 
capita
Denmark    2.2  2  1.9 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.8  2 
France  2.1 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.6 
Germany    1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 0.7 0.9  1  1.3 1.1 1.6 
Italy    1.8 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.1 1.3 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.4 
Latvia    7.9 8.5 4.3 4.9 2.4 2.9 1.5  2  0.7 1.1 
Luxembourg    3.2 2.2 2.9  2  2.1 1.2 2.2 1.5 2.3 1.7 
Netherlands    1.7 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.9 
Poland    5.8 6 3.7 4 2.7  2.9  1.3  1.6  0.5 1 
Spain    3.3 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.7 0.6  1 
United  Kingdom  2.9 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Table 9. Per capita GDP, euro (constant prices 2004) 
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    37,682 41,539 49,427 56,273 64,506 78,620 
France 28,790  31,148  36,228 41,802 48,158 56,578 
Germany   27,711  30,408  35,728 39,050 44,571 52,173 
Italy   24,456  26,565  31,590 35,963 39,467 45,508 
Latvia    4,863  7,320 11,856 15,762 19,126 21,250 
Luxembourg    59,738 66,591 81,540 91,899  106,197  126,095 
Netherlands   30,928  32,971  38,253 42,896 49,903 60,425 
Poland    5,387  7,218 10,637 14,099 16,519 18,253 
Spain    19,183 21,517 26,932 31,024 33,349 36,873 
United Kingdom   29,516  33,421  41,411 47,764 55,146 64,444 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Table 10. Employment rates  
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    75.5 76.4 77.3 77.1 77.4 77.8 
France  63.7 64.4 66.2 67.4 68.2 68.0 
Germany    66.4 70.8 73.4 72.9 73.7 73.3 
Italy    57.5 61.0 63.7 64.1 65.1 65.6 
Latvia   63.6  69.9  73.7 72.6 72.2 71.4 
Luxembourg    63.5 64.4 65.1 65.0 65.8 65.5 
Netherlands    74.3 75.3 76.6 76.7 78.2 77.9 
Poland   52.2  57.0  64.8 68.6 66.2 66.1 
Spain    61.7 66.3 70.1 70.1 70.3 71.3 
United Kingdom   71.8  72.8  74.3  74.3  75.1  74.7 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Employment rates (Table 10) are around 70% and above in Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
UK, with little variation over the projection period. Germany shows a considerable increase 
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working age population. France and Luxembourg increase slightly. Finally, Italy and Poland 
start from the lowest employment rates, but show a very dynamic increase afterwards.  
4.2  Social protection and sustainability  
The main results about social protection expenditure in cash – according to the ESSPROS 
definition – are collected in Table 11. The same results are shown graphically in Figures 2 and 
3. In this case, old-age pensions include public as well as private pension provisions. Old-age 
pensions constitute the major component of social expenditure in cash. It is projected to grow in 
most countries, with the exception of Poland. This result is mainly driven by the dramatically 
decreasing replacement rates used in the projections. All other benefits develop according to 
wage growth and the evolution of their beneficiaries, which in turn is driven by demography. 
Housing benefits are not reported in the table because their value is zero. The old-age pensions 
expenditure reported in Table 11 is computed with survival probabilities consistent with the 
demographic projections. Table 12 shows the effect of introducing ‘evolving’ survival rates 
compared with the case of constant life tables.  
Old-age expenditure is decomposed according to its determinants in Equation 20. The 
dependency effect (i.e. the ratio between population older than 65 and working age population) 
is the demographic driver of pension expenditure. The employment effect (i.e. the inverse of the 
employment rate) is the macroeconomic driver: an increase in employment rate busts economic 
growth and reduces the number of people in working age receiving a pension; thus an increase 
of employment ratio (i.e. a decrease of the ‘employment effect’) alleviates the pension burden. 
The take-up effect (i.e. the ratio between the number of pensioners and population aged more 
than 65) and the benefit effect (i.e. the ratio between average pension and average productivity) 
combine the influence of pension rules and of the macroeconomic framework. The take-up 
effect mirrors the pension eligibility rules, but is mainly a consequence of the evolution of 
participation and employment rates: if employment increases among women, for example, then 
a higher number of them will receive a pension in the future. The benefit effect depends on the 
pension calculation formula, on the indexation mechanism, on the pension eligibility rules and 
on past employment rates as far as the average pension is concerned (numerator). The 
denominator is the average labour productivity, whose determinants are linked to 
macroeconomic and technological factors, and, in our simulations, is also influenced by the 
effects that the ageing process has on private savings and consumption (EC, 2005). 
__ _ _
65 (15 64) /
(15 64) 65 /
Dependency effect Employment effect Take up effect Benefit effect
PensExp Pop Pop PensNo PensExp PensNo
GDP Pop Employed Pop GDP Employed
−
>−
=×× ×
−> 14 424 4 31 4 42 4 4 31 424 31 4 4 424 4 4 3
 
(20)
Equation 21 shows the same relation expressed as the product of the ratios of each item at time t 
and at time 0, where the ratio is measured between 2004 and 2050. Table 12 displays this 
decomposition, that can be read as (a) = (b)*(c)*(d)*(e).  
00 0 0 0
/
/
tt t t t PensExp GDP DepEff EmplEff Take upEff BenefitEff
PensExp GDP DepEff EmplEff Take upEff BenefitEff
−
=× × ×
−
  (21)
The role of demography in increasing pension expenditure is clearly visible in Table 13. The 
variation of the dependency effect is often higher than pension expenditure growth itself. 
Labour market and pension reforms undertaken by governments, captured by the variations of 
other decomposition factors, prove quite effective in partially offsetting the burden of ageing on 
pension expenditure, which would be otherwise explosive. 24 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
Table 11. Social protection expenditure in cash (ESSPROS definition), as a % of GDP 
   
Old 
age 
Un 
empl 
Fam/ 
child 
Sick/ 
health  Disab Surviv Social 
excl  Total 
2005  9.2 2.6 1.6 1.0 2.8 0.0 0.8  18.0 
Denmark  
2050  16.8 2.3 1.4 1.0 2.8 0.0 0.7  25.0 
2005  10.4 2.2 2.0 0.7 1.2 1.9 0.4  18.8 
France 
2050  10.8 1.9 1.8 0.7 1.2 1.6 0.3  18.3 
2005  11.5 2.1 2.2 1.4 1.5 0.4 0.4  19.4 
Germany  
2050  16.5 1.7 2.1 1.4 1.5 0.7 0.4  24.2 
2005  13.0 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.4 2.5 0.0  18.6 
Italy  
2050  24.3 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.4 2.4 0.0  29.8 
2005  5.7 0.4 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.1 9.2 
Latvia  
2050  15.7 0.3 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.1  19.2 
2005  5.8 1.1 3.4 0.8 2.1 2.3 0.4  15.8 
Luxembourg 
2050  13.3 1.3 3.2 0.9 2.1 1.6 0.4  22.6 
2005  8.7 1.7 0.7 2.1 2.6 1.4 0.5  17.8 
Netherlands  
2050  13.0 1.7 0.7 2.1 2.6 1.4 0.4  22.0 
2005  10.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 2.3 1.0 0.1  16.5 
Poland  
2050  8.3 0.3 0.9 0.7 2.3 1.0 0.1  13.7 
2005  8.1 2.4 0.4 1.2 1.4 0.6 0.0  14.1 
Spain  
2050  27.2 2.0 0.4 1.2 1.4 0.6 0.0  32.7 
2005  10.0 0.5 1.3 0.6 2.0 0.8 0.1  15.4  United 
Kingdom   2050  15.6 0.5 1.2 0.6 2.0 0.5 0.1  20.4 
Source: our calculations (SAM).  
Note: old-age includes public and private pensions, ‘evolving’ life tables. 
 
Figure 2. Social protection expenditure in cash (ESSPROS), as a % of GDP, 2005  
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Source: our calculations (SAM). 
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Figure 3. Social protection expenditure in cash (ESSPROS), as a % of GDP, 2050 
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Source: our calculations (SAM).  
 
Table 12. Old-age expenditure (in cash, ESSPROS definition), as a % of GDP 
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
‘Evolving’ tables         
Denmark    9.2 10.6 12.9 15.8 17.6 16.8 
France  10.4 10.3 10.4 10.8 11.1 10.8 
Germany    11.5 10.6 10.7 13.8 15.7 16.5 
Italy    13.0 13.0 13.9 17.3 22.3 24.3 
Latvia    5.7 5.5 7.4 9.9  12.4  15.7 
Luxembourg   5.8  6.3  8.4  11.6  13.0  13.3 
Netherlands    8.7  8.9 10.2 12.6 13.5 13.0 
Poland    10.8 7.8 6.5 6.3 7.2 8.3 
Spain    8.1  9.1 11.1 15.7 22.9 27.2 
United Kingdom   10.0  10.1  11.0  13.2  14.4  15.6 
          
Constant tables        
Denmark    9.2 10.4 12.1 14.0 15.0 13.7 
France  10.4 9.9 9.5 9.3 9.1 8.6 
Germany    11.6 10.2  9.6 11.8 12.7 12.7 
Italy    13.0 12.6 12.8 15.3 18.9 19.5 
Latvia    5.7 5.4 6.7 8.5 9.8  11.8 
Luxembourg   5.7  6.0  7.6  10.1  10.8  10.5 
Netherlands   8.7  8.7  9.6  11.3  11.8  11.2 
Poland    10.8 7.5 5.9 5.3 5.7 6.4 
Spain    8.0  8.7 10.1 13.9 19.7 22.4 
United Kingdom   10.0  9.8  10.1  11.5  12.0  12.5 
 
 26 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
Table 13. Old-age pension expenditure decomposition  
  0
/
/
t PensExp GDP
PensExp GDP
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t DepEff
DepEff
 
0
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Take upEff
−
−
 
0
t BenefitEff
BenefitEff
 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
Denmark   1.34  1.77  0.97  0.90  0.87 
France 1.03  1.89  0.94  0.81  0.72 
Germany   1.07  2.01  0.91  0.79  0.74 
Italy   1.58  2.24  0.88  0.81  0.99 
Latvia   2.78  1.83  0.89  1.04  1.65 
Luxembourg   2.31  1.71  0.97  1.11  1.25 
Netherlands   1.44  1.87  0.95  0.79  1.02 
Poland   0.77  2.72  0.79  0.80  0.45 
Spain   3.37  2.75  0.87  1.14  1.24 
United Kingdom   1.72  1.86  0.96  0.80  1.20 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Note: pension expenditure is computed according to the ESSPROS definition, ‘evolving’ life tables. 
Table 14 presents projections of public pensions expenditure calculated with SAM using 
alternative starting values, that is those taken from EPC-EC (2005). For an explanation of the 
difference between data in Tables 11 and 14, see sub-section 3.6. Spain and Luxembourg have 
the fastest growing expenditure, and Poland shows a decreasing expenditure to GDP, as in the 
EPC-EC (2005). Results in Table 14 can be compared with those in Table 15, that collects 
results from EPC-EC (2005) itself. The initial values in Tables 14 and 15 are very similar by 
hypothesis, but our results at 2050 are generally higher than EPC-EC (2005)’s ones, with the 
exception of France, Germany and the Netherlands where they are lower. 
Table 14. Public pensions (AWG definition), as % of GDP  
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    9.8 11.1 12.8 14.5 14.9 13.1 
France  12.8 12.6 12.8 13.3 13.7 13.2 
Germany    11.3 10.3  9.9 11.8 12.5 12.0 
Italy    14.2 14.1 14.6 17.6 21.6 22.5 
Latvia    6.8 6.6 8.8  11.9  14.8  18.8 
Luxembourg    10.0 11.0 14.5 20.1 22.5 23.1 
Netherlands    7.7 7.8 8.8  10.9  11.5  11.0 
Poland    13.0 9.3 7.8 7.6 8.7  10.0 
Spain    8.8  9.9 12.1 17.1 24.9 29.6 
United Kingdom   6.6  6.7  7.4  9.1  10.3  11.4 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Note: public pensions include old-age, early retirement, disability and widows’ pensions, ‘evolving’ life tables. A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 27 
 
Table 15. EC’s projections of public pensions expenditure, as % of GDP 
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    9.5 10.1 11.3 12.8 13.5 12.8 
France    12.8 12.9 13.7 14.3  15 14.8 
Germany    11.4 10.5  11 12.3 12.8 13.1 
Italy    14.2 14 14 15  15.9  14.7 
Latvia    6.8 4.9 4.9 5.6 5.9 5.6 
Luxembourg   10  9.8  11.9  15  17  17.4 
Netherlands    7.7  7.6  9 10.7 11.7 11.2 
Poland   13.9  11.3  9.7  9.2  8.6  8 
Spain    8.6  8.9  9.3 11.8 15.2 15.7 
United Kingdom   6.6  6.6  6.9  7.9  8.4  8.6 
Source: ECP-EC (2005). 
The sustainability analysis is presented in Tables 16 and 17. In this exercise, sustainability is not 
about the pension expenditure-GDP ratio per se, but about the possibility of governments to tax 
citizens, or to issue public debt, in order to support that ratio. We calculated the public pension 
‘notional contribution rate’, displayed in Table 17. A comparison of the theoretical index with 
the effective national payroll taxes and with the current level of debt to GDP can be helpful to 
gain insights on the present and future sustainability of the system. Even though there are no 
objective criteria to assess what a tolerable notional payroll tax rate is, it is straightforward that 
a notional payroll tax rate projected to increase well above its current effective level, 
accompanied by a high level of public debt, is a signal of future sustainability problems.    
For instance in both Italy and Spain the notional payroll tax rate in 2030 and 2050 is higher than 
the current one, but the two countries will face different sustainability problems given their 
present remarkable difference in the debt to GDP ratio, that is palpably higher in Italy that in 
Spain. The comparison between current and notional payroll tax rates is, instead, less 
meaningful in Denmark and the UK, because public pensions are financed by taxes in the first 
place and there are no separate contributions for old-age pensions in the UK.  
Table 16. Notional equilibrium payroll tax rate   
  “Standard definition”  Corrected with public debt 
  2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 
Denmark    19.2 25.4 23.0 19.1 25.9 23.1 
France  31.5 33.6 33.4 31.5 34.3 34.1 
Germany    27.8 32.2 33.0 27.7 34.1 34.3 
Italy    35.7 45.0 57.6 38.0 49.6 61.1 
Latvia   13.1  23.0  36.7 11.9 22.8 37.0 
Luxembourg    20.2 37.3 43.0 20.2 37.3 43.0 
Netherlands    10.7 15.3 15.5 11.1 16.0 15.8 
Poland   25.4  20.9  28.0 20.9 20.4 30.1 
Spain    21.2 37.0 64.2 20.9 37.8 65.3 
United Kingdom   4.9  6.7  8.4  4.7  6.9  8.7 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Note: pension expenditure and income bill are both from semi-aggregate projections, ‘evolving’ life tables. 
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Table 17. Context indicators for sustainability  
  Effective old-age contribution rates 
(employee plus employer), 2004 
Public debt to GDP, 
% 2004 
Denmark Tax-financed 36.0 
France 24  66.2 
Germany 19.5 67.3 
Italy 33  108.8 
Latvia   33.09  10.9 
Luxembourg 16  4.4 
Netherlands 19.5  52.1 
Poland 32.52  47.7 
Spain 28.3  42.9 
United Kingdom  No separate pension contribution  43.1 
Source: payroll tax rates: OECD (2007) and EC (2006); debt: Eurostat.  
5.  Alternative scenarios: hypotheses and results 
This section presents results for alternative scenarios. Since the main driving factors of the 
projections are the demographic evolution and the hypotheses on the labour market, a number of 
scenarios will deal with these exogenous assumptions. Moreover, since the old-age pension 
expenditure is also driven by the assumptions on the replacement rates, this hypothesis will also 
be investigated.  
Section 5.1 presents results for the so-called ‘Lisbon scenario’. In Section 5.2 the effect of high 
and low demographic scenarios on macroeconomic variables and social expenditure is 
alternatively analysed. Section 5.3 explores the impact of different replacement rates.   
5.1  Lisbon scenario  
As mentioned in its description, the model also allows us to set exogenous targets for the 
employment rates to be reached in a given year. This can be used to analyse the effect of 
reaching the employment targets set in the Lisbon and Stockholm European Councils on the 
overall economy and on social expenditure. This is obviously an unrealistic scenario, since it is 
apparent that many countries will not meet such targets by the given date. However, this allows 
us to appreciate the effects of higher employment and participation rates on social protection 
expenditure. Further, the same exercise could be repeated imposing the attainment of the targets 
over a more reasonable horizon (e.g. 2015 or later).   
The employment targets the model is imposing are:  
-  70% for total employment;  
-  60% for female employment;  
-  50% for middle-aged (55-64) employment.    
The Lisbon scenario does not change anything in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK because the employment level they attain in 2010 in the baseline projection scenario is 
already beyond 70%. For other countries, employment rates increase steeply – and 
unrealistically – between 2005 and 2010 to reach the targets and then vary according to the 
evolution of demography and the unemployment exogenous projections (Tables 18 to 20). After 
2010 total employment rates vary very little both across countries and over time, as they already 
reached relatively high levels. A higher degree of variation is present, however, in the 
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Table 18. Employment rate, total – Lisbon scenario, % 
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    76.4 77.3 77.1 77.4 77.8 76.4 
France    70.0 70.0 70.1 70.9 71.0 70.0 
Germany    70.8 73.4 72.9 73.7 73.3 70.8 
Italy    70.0 70.0 70.0 71.1 71.6 70.0 
Latvia    70.0 71.6 71.6 71.7 72.1 70.0 
Luxembourg    70.0 70.0 70.3 70.6 70.6 70.0 
Netherlands    75.3 76.6 76.7 78.2 77.9 75.3 
Poland    70.0 71.6 72.0 72.0 72.8 70.0 
Spain    70.0 70.0 70.0 70.7 71.8 70.0 
United Kingdom   72.8  74.3  74.3  75.1  74.7  72.8 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Table 19. Employment rate, female – Lisbon scenario, % 
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    70.9 72.0 72.9 72.5 72.9 73.4 
France    57.3 63.6 63.6 63.7 64.5 64.5 
Germany    59.8 64.8 67.2 66.8 67.8 67.2 
Italy    47.2 60.0 60.1 60.3 61.3 61.7 
Latvia    59.5 65.5 67.1 67.5 67.5 67.9 
Luxembourg    54.2 60.2 60.4 60.7 61.0 61.0 
Netherlands    66.9 69.5 72.4 73.3 74.9 74.6 
Poland    49.8 65.1 66.8 67.4 67.4 68.2 
Spain    51.8 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.9 62.1 
United Kingdom   65.8  67.3  69.6  70.3  71.4  71.1 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Table 20. Employment rate, middle-aged (55-64) – Lisbon scenario, % 
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    60.7 60.8 64.8 63.1 62.3 65.9 
France    39.2 50.0 50.9 51.2 53.0 53.1 
Germany    39.5 53.1 61.9 60.0 62.7 61.6 
Italy    33.1 50.0 52.3 53.0 53.2 54.1 
Latvia    45.0 50.8 51.3 53.3 54.4 54.7 
Luxembourg    33.8 50.0 50.9 50.9 52.0 52.6 
Netherlands    46.2 50.0 52.9 52.5 54.2 54.8 
Poland    28.2 50.0 50.0 52.3 54.7 54.9 
Spain    41.1 50.0 52.3 54.0 54.1 54.9 
United Kingdom   55.3  56.3  61.3  61.3  63.3  62.9 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Old-age pensions expenditure decreases as a percentage of GDP for all the countries where the 
Lisbon targets would not be achieved in the baseline scenario (Tables 21 and 23). In Poland, 
Spain and Italy, the reduction is of two percentage points or more in both tables. Other types of 
expenditure undergo modest reductions as well, but by smaller percentages. A similar reduction 
applies to the notional payroll tax rate (Table 24).  30 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
This reduction in pension expenditure goes through the three channels where employment plays 
a role, these are the employment effect, the take-up effect and the benefits effect (Table 22). In 
particular, the employment effect has a greater offsetting impact in this scenario with respect to 
the baseline one.  
Table 21. Social protection expenditure in cash (ESSPROS definition), as a % of GDP  
   
Old 
age 
Un 
empl 
Fam/ 
child 
Sick/ 
health  Disab Surviv Social 
excl  Total 
2005  9.2 2.6 1.6 1.0 2.8 0.0 0.8  18.0 
Denmark  
2050  16.8  2.3 1.4 1.0 2.8 0.0 0.7  25.0 
2005  10.3  2.2 2.0 0.7 1.2 1.8 0.4  18.6 
France 
2050  10.3  1.8 1.8 0.7 1.2 1.5 0.3  17.5 
2005  11.5  2.1 2.2 1.4 1.5 0.4 0.4  19.4 
Germany  
2050  16.5  1.7 2.1 1.4 1.5 0.7 0.4  24.2 
2005  12.4  0.4 0.6 0.5 1.4 2.4 0.0  17.9 
Italy  
2050  22.0  0.4 0.6 0.5 1.4 2.2 0.0  27.1 
2005  5.6 0.4 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.1 9.2 
Latvia  
2050  14.4  0.3 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.1  17.8 
2005  5.7 1.1 3.3 0.8 2.1 2.3 0.4  15.6 
Luxembourg 
2050  13.8  1.3 3.0 0.9 2.1 1.5 0.3  22.8 
2005  8.7 1.7 0.7 2.1 2.6 1.4 0.5  17.8 
Netherlands  
2050  13.0  1.7 0.7 2.1 2.6 1.4 0.4  22.0 
2005  10.2  0.7 0.9 0.7 2.3 1.0 0.1  15.9 
Poland  
2050  7.6 0.3 0.9 0.7 2.3 1.0 0.1  12.9 
2005  8.0 2.3 0.4 1.2 1.4 0.6 0.0  13.9 
Spain  
2050  25.2  1.9 0.4 1.2 1.4 0.6 0.0  30.7 
2005  10.0  0.5 1.3 0.6 2.0 0.8 0.1  15.4  United 
Kingdom   2050  15.6  0.5 1.2 0.6 2.0 0.5 0.1  20.4 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Note: old-age includes public and private pensions, ‘evolving’ life tables. 
Table 22. Old-age pension expenditure decomposition  
  0
/
/
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Take upEff
−
−
 
0
t BenefitEff
BenefitEff
 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
Denmark   1.34  1.77  0.97  0.90  0.87 
France 1.00  1.89  0.90  0.81  0.72 
Germany   1.07  2.01  0.91  0.79  0.74 
Italy   1.49  2.24  0.82  0.80  1.01 
Latvia   2.56  1.83  0.88  0.93  1.69 
Luxembourg   2.44  1.71  0.91  1.15  1.37 
Netherlands   1.44  1.87  0.95  0.79  1.02 
Poland   0.74  2.72  0.75  0.79  0.46 
Spain   3.16  2.75  0.87  1.03  1.29 
United Kingdom   1.72  1.86  0.96  0.80  1.20 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
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Table 23. Public pensions (AWG definition), as % of GDP  
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    9.8  11.1 12.8 14.5 14.9 13.1 
France  12.5 10.7 11.7 12.8 13.0 12.4 
Germany    11.3 10.3  9.9  11.8 12.5 12.0 
Italy    13.7 11.3 13.7 16.7 20.0 20.5 
Latvia    6.7 6.5 9.0  11.5  14.1  17.2 
Luxembourg   9.6  8.7  14.4  20.2  23.3  23.5 
Netherlands    7.7 7.8 8.8  10.9  11.5  11.0 
Poland    12.3  6.8 7.2 7.7 8.2 9.1 
Spain   8.6  8.8  12.2  16.8  23.2  27.2 
United Kingdom   6.6  6.7  7.4  9.1  10.3  11.4 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Note: public pensions include old-age, early retirement, disability and widows’ pensions, ‘evolving’ life tables. 
Table 24. Notional payroll tax rate – without public debt  
  Lisbon Baseline 
  2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 
Denmark    19.2 25.4 23.0 19.2 25.4 23.0 
France  28.0 33.8 32.8 31.5 33.6 33.4 
Germany    27.8 32.2 33.0 27.8 32.2 33.0 
Italy    29.6 44.3 54.3 35.7 45.0 57.6 
Latvia   13.1  22.5  34.1 13.1 23.0 36.7 
Luxembourg    16.6 38.6 45.1 20.2 37.3 43.0 
Netherlands    10.7 15.3 15.5 10.7 15.3 15.5 
Poland   19.4  21.8  26.4 25.4 20.9 28.0 
Spain    19.3 36.8 60.2 21.2 37.0 64.2 
United Kingdom   4.9  6.7  8.4  4.9  6.7  8.4 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Note: pension expenditure and income bill are both from semi-aggregate projections, ‘evolving’ life tables. 
5.2  Sensitivity analysis on demographic projections  
Eurostat releases several variants of population projections. Among the various available, we 
selected the ‘high’ and ‘low’ variants to serve as an input for sensitivity tests. The high 
demographic projections differ from the baseline in that they assume higher values for the key 
parameters, which are net migration, total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth for males and 
females. The reverse applies to the low variant.  
Dependency rates presented in Table 25 are based on the demographic projections that 
constitute an input to the model. They are higher with respect to the baseline for the low 
demographic variant and lower for the high variant. For some countries, the low variant tends to 
produce slightly higher employment rates, by one or two percentage points, during the middle of 
the simulation period, around 2020s-2030s (Table 27). In the ling run, per capita GDP growth 
rates are higher in the high variant (Table 26).  
The lower dependency rates for the high variant correspond to lower values of social protection 
expenditures (Table 28). Analogously, notional payroll tax rates are lower in the high variant 
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Table 25. Dependency rates  
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Low demographic scenario   
Denmark    22.6 24.8 31.0 37.0 43.1 42.1 
France  25.3 25.8 33.0 40.8 47.8 49.8 
Germany    27.8 31.1 35.3 47.3 58.1 60.9 
Italy    29.4 31.3 36.6 45.8 62.1 70.2 
Latvia   24.1  25.2  27.9 34.0 38.8 46.2 
Luxembourg    21.2 21.7 25.4 33.9 41.2 41.1 
Netherlands    20.7 22.2 29.0 37.4 43.6 41.5 
Poland   18.7  18.7  26.7 36.1 40.6 53.0 
Spain    24.5 25.4 29.9 39.2 56.4 72.5 
United Kingdom   24.4  25.2  30.6  38.5  46.6  49.2 
        
Baseline demographic scenario   
Denmark    22.6 24.8 31.2 37.1 42.1 40.0 
France  25.3 25.9 33.2 40.7 46.9 47.9 
Germany    27.8 31.0 35.1 46.0 54.6 55.8 
Italy    29.4 31.3 36.6 45.2 59.8 66.0 
Latvia   24.1  25.2  28.0 33.4 37.4 44.1 
Luxembourg    21.2 21.6 24.7 31.5 36.7 36.1 
Netherlands    20.7 22.2 29.0 36.7 41.6 38.6 
Poland   18.7  18.8  27.1 35.7 39.7 51.0 
Spain    24.5 25.4 30.0 38.9 54.3 67.5 
United Kingdom   24.4  25.1  30.3  37.4  43.8  45.3 
        
High demographic scenario   
Denmark    22.6 24.9 31.5 37.4 41.8 39.2 
France  25.3 25.8 33.3 40.4 45.7 45.9 
Germany    27.8 30.9 35.0 44.9 51.2 50.5 
Italy    29.4 31.4 37.1 45.3 57.9 61.9 
Latvia   24.1  25.2  28.1 32.6 35.0 40.1 
Luxembourg    21.1 21.5 24.4 30.6 35.0 34.4 
Netherlands    20.7 22.1 28.9 36.0 39.6 36.1 
Poland   18.7  18.8  27.3 35.2 38.0 46.7 
Spain    24.5 25.4 30.2 38.6 52.4 62.9 
United Kingdom   24.4  25.1  30.6  37.3  42.5  43.2 
Source: our computation on Eurostat data. 
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Table 26. Per capita GDP growth, period average, % growth  
  Low demographic scenario  High demographic scenario 
 
2005-
2010 
2011-
2020 
2021-
2030 
2031-
2040 
2041-
2050 
2005-
2010 
2011-
2020 
2021-
2030 
2031-
2040 
2041-
2050 
Denmark    2.1 1.9 1.4 1.3 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.2 1.4 2.0 
France  1.7 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 
Germany    1.9 1.7 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.5 0.8 1.4 1.7 
Italy    1.6 1.9 1.4 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.5 
Latvia    8.6 5.1 2.9 1.9 1.0 8.4 4.7 2.8 2.0 1.1 
Luxembourg    2.3 2.1 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.0 1.1 1.4 1.7 
Netherlands    1.4 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.6 1.9 
Poland    6.1 4.1 2.9 1.5 0.9 5.9 3.7 2.7 1.7 1.1 
Spain    2.5 2.4 1.5 0.6 0.9 2.3 2.1 1.3 0.8 1.1 
United  Kingdom  2.6 2.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 2.5 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.6 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Table 27. Employment rates, % 
  Low demographic scenario  High demographic scenario 
  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    76.4 77.3 77.2 77.7 78.0 76.3 77.3 77.0 77.3 77.8 
France  64.4 66.2 68.0 68.9 68.3 64.4 66.1 67.0 67.6 67.6 
Germany    70.8 73.4 73.2 74.2 73.6 70.8 73.4 72.5 73.1 72.9 
Italy    61.0 63.7 64.5 65.5 65.8 61.1 63.8 63.7 64.4 65.2 
Latvia    69.9 73.7 73.4 72.7 71.3 69.9 73.7 71.6 71.3 71.0 
Luxembourg    64.3 64.7 65.1 66.2 65.9 64.4 65.3 65.0 65.4 65.2 
Netherlands    75.3 76.5 76.7 78.1 77.6 75.4 76.7 76.8 78.3 78.2 
Poland    57.0 64.8 69.5 66.3 65.5 57.0 64.9 67.6 65.5 66.2 
Spain    66.3 70.1 70.6 70.7 71.6 66.3 70.1 69.6 69.7 70.8 
United  Kingdom    72.8 74.2 74.4 75.2 74.7 72.9 74.4 74.2 75.0 74.7 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Table 28. Social protection expenditure in cash (ESSPROS definition), as a % of GDP 
  
Old 
age  Unempl  Fam/
child 
Sick/
health  Disab Surviv Social 
excl  Total 
Low demographic scenario      
2005  9.2 2.6 1.6  1.0  2.8  0.0  0.8  18.0 
Denmark  
2050  18.7  2.3  1.3 1.0 2.8 0.0 0.7  26.8 
2005  10.4  2.2  2.0 0.7 1.2 1.9 0.4  18.8 
France 
2050  11.6  1.9  1.8 0.7 1.2 1.6 0.3  19.2 
2005  11.5  2.1  2.2 1.4 1.5 0.4 0.4  19.5 
Germany  
2050  18.8  1.7  2.2 1.3 1.5 0.8 0.4  26.7 
2005  13.0  0.5  0.7 0.5 1.4 2.5 0.0  18.6 
Italy  
2050  26.6  0.5  0.7 0.5 1.4 2.5 0.0  32.3 
2005  5.7 0.4 1.1  0.6  1.0  0.3  0.1  9.2 
Latvia  
2050  18.2  0.3  1.1 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.1  21.6 
2005  5.8 1.1 3.4  0.8  2.1  2.3  0.4  15.8 
Luxembourg  
2050  15.3  1.3  3.2 0.8 2.1 1.8 0.4  24.9 34 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
2005  8.7 1.7 0.7  2.1  2.6  1.4  0.5  17.8 
Netherlands  
2050  14.7  1.8  0.7 2.1 2.6 1.6 0.4  24.0 
2005  10.8  0.7  0.9 0.7 2.3 1.0 0.1  16.5 
Poland  
2050  9.6 0.3 0.9  0.7  2.3  1.0  0.1  15.0 
2005  8.1 2.4 0.4  1.2  1.4  0.6  0.0  14.1 
Spain  
2050  30.2  2.0  0.3 1.2 1.4 0.6 0.0  35.8 
2005  10.0  0.5  1.3 0.6 2.0 0.8 0.1  15.4  United 
Kingdom   2050  17.5  0.4  1.1 0.6 2.0 0.6 0.1  22.4 
                 
High demographic scenario   
2005  9.2 2.6 1.6  1.0  2.8  0.0  0.8  18.0 
Denmark  
2050  15.5  2.3  1.4 1.0 2.8 0.0 0.7  23.7 
2005  10.4  2.2  2.0 0.7 1.2 1.9 0.4  18.8 
France 
2050  10.0  1.9  1.8 0.7 1.2 1.5 0.3  17.5 
2005  11.5  2.1  2.2 1.4 1.5 0.4 0.4  19.4 
Germany  
2050  14.2  1.6  2.1 1.4 1.5 0.6 0.4  21.8 
2005  13.0  0.5  0.7 0.5 1.4 2.5 0.0  18.6 
Italy  
2050  22.0  0.4  0.7 0.5 1.4 2.3 0.0  27.3 
2005  5.7 0.4 1.1  0.6  1.0  0.3  0.1  9.2 
Latvia  
2050  13.3  0.3  1.1 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.1  16.7 
2005  5.8 1.1 3.3  0.8  2.1  2.3  0.4  15.8 
Luxembourg  
2050  12.3  1.3  3.1 0.9 2.1 1.5 0.4  21.5 
2005  8.7 1.7 0.7  2.1  2.6  1.4  0.5  17.8 
Netherlands  
2050  11.5  1.6  0.7 2.1 2.7 1.3 0.4  20.3 
2005  10.8  0.7  0.9 0.7 2.3 1.0 0.1  16.5 
Poland  
2050  7.0 0.3 0.9  0.7  2.3  1.0  0.1  12.4 
2005  8.1 2.4 0.4  1.2  1.4  0.6  0.0  14.0 
Spain  
2050  24.4  1.9  0.4 1.2 1.4 0.6 0.0  29.9 
2005  10.0  0.5  1.3 0.6 2.0 0.8 0.1  15.4  United 
Kingdom   2050  14.0  0.5  1.2 0.6 2.0 0.5 0.1  18.9 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Note: old-age includes public and private pensions, ‘evolving’ life tables. 
Table 29. Sustainability indicator – not corrected for public debt  
  Low demographic scenario  High demographic scenario 
  2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 
Denmark    19.2 26.0 25.1 19.1 24.8 21.4 
France  31.5 34.0 35.6 31.3 33.0 31.2 
Germany    28.0 33.8 37.4 27.7 30.7 28.7 
Italy    35.8 45.7 62.6 35.6 43.8 52.6 
Latvia   13.2  24.0  42.3 13.0 22.0 31.2 
Luxembourg    20.4 40.4 49.1 20.1 35.5 39.9 
Netherlands    10.8 15.8 17.3 10.7 14.6 13.9 
Poland   25.5  21.7  32.1 25.3 20.3 23.8 
Spain    21.3 38.0 70.9 21.1 36.0 58.4 
United Kingdom   5.0  7.1  9.4  4.9  6.5  7.6 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
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5.3  Sensitivity analysis on old-age benefits level 
The work by the Indicators Sub-Group of the Social Protection Committee (ISG-SPC, 2006) 
contains theoretical replacement rates (RRs) projections for several ‘representative individuals’. 
Individuals with income equal to the national average are chosen as the benchmark and used in 
the baseline scenario of the present study. These are male full-time workers, employed from the 
age of 25 to 65, thus with 40 years’ seniority.  
These replacement rates not only might not be representative of the whole population but might 
not provide a correct representation of the evolution of future benefits level. Given the 
unavoidable uncertainty of long-term projections and the importance of theoretical replacement 
rates in the computation of aggregate expenditure, a sensitivity analysis on replacement rates is 
needed.  
Results are presented assuming that replacement rates of new pensioners – and therefore their 
old-age benefits – can be 5 percentage points higher or lower than the baseline.  
As expected, lower replacement rates produce pension expenditures by 0.5-1.5 percentage 
points lower depending on the countries (Tables 30 and 31). In the same way, the notional 
payroll tax rate is lower for lower RRs in all the countries analysed (Table 32). 
Table 30. Social protection expenditure in cash (ESSPROS definition), as a % of GDP  
   
Old –age expenditure with 
Higher RR 
Old-age expenditure with 
Lower RR 
2005  9.2 9.2 
Denmark  
2050  17.7 15.9 
2005  10.4 10.4 
France 
2050  11.6 10.0 
2005  11.5 11.5 
Germany  
2050  17.5 15.5 
2005  13.0 13.0 
Italy  
2050  25.3 23.3 
2005  5.7 5.7 
Latvia  
2050  16.6 14.8 
2005  5.8 5.8 
Luxembourg 
2050  13.8 12.8 
2005  8.7 8.7 
Netherlands  
2050  15.6 14.4 
2005  10.8 10.8 
Poland  
2050  10.1 8.6 
2005  8.1 8.1 
Spain  
2050  28.4 25.9 
2005  10.0 10.0  United 
Kingdom   2050  20.1 18.3 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
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Table 31. Public pensions expenditure (AWG definition)  
 
Public pension expenditure with 
Higher RR 
Public pension expenditure with 
Lower RR 
  2010 2030 2050 2010  2030 2050 
Denmark   11.1  15.0  14.1  11.0  14.1  12.1 
France 12.6  13.7  14.2  12.6  12.9  12.3 
Germany   10.3  12.2  13.0  10.3  11.4  11.0 
Italy   14.1  17.9  23.6  14.1  17.2  21.4 
Latvia   6.6  12.2  19.8  6.6  11.5  17.7 
Luxembourg   11.0  20.5  24.0  10.9  19.7  22.2 
Netherlands   8.2  13.0  14.0  8.1  11.8  11.5 
Poland   9.6  8.6  12.2  9.6  8.1  10.4 
Spain   9.9  17.5  30.9  9.8  16.8  28.2 
United Kingdom   7.2  12.1  16.6  7.1  10.1  11.7 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Note: ‘Evolving’ life tables. 
Table 32. Notional payroll tax rate (without public debt)  
 
Notional payroll tax rate with 
Higher RR 
Notional payroll tax rate with 
Lower RR 
 2010  2030  2050  2010  2030  2050 
Denmark   19.2  26.2  24.7  19.1  24.6  21.2 
France 31.5  34.6  35.8  31.4  32.7  31.0 
Germany   27.9  33.3  35.7  27.8  31.0  30.3 
Italy   35.8  46.0  60.4  35.7  44.0  54.7 
Latvia   13.2  23.6  38.7 13.1 22.3 34.6 
Luxembourg   20.3  38.0  44.6  20.2  36.6  41.4 
Netherlands   11.0  17.8  19.4  11.0  16.3  15.9 
Poland   23.0  21.0  30.0 23.0 19.8 25.6 
Spain   21.3  37.8  67.1  21.2  36.2  61.3 
United Kingdom   5.2  8.7  11.9  5.1  7.3  8.4 
Source: our calculations (SAM). 
Note: pension expenditure and income bills are both from semi-aggregate projections, ‘evolving’ life tables. 
6. Conclusions 
The SAM model described in this study was mainly developed to deliver semi-aggregate 
projections by age class and gender of income sources, including social protection benefits, in 
order to provide an input to compute Comprehensive Replacement Rates (COREs). The model 
includes a selection of European countries – namely Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the UK – and carries out projection over a time 
horizon spanning from 2005 to 2050.  
The partial equilibrium adopted allows both a greater flexibility in the choice of countries and in 
the building of scenarios, while at the same time offering an easier understanding of its inner 
mechanisms with respect to general equilibrium models. While providing semi-aggregate 
projections, the model can also supply projections of main macroeconomic aggregates. 
In particular, the model is able to provide insights into labour market evolution and economic 
growth developments, taking into account the effect of population ageing on the basis of A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 37 
 
demographic projections up to 2050. It also produces projections of different components of 
household income, devoting special attention to old-age benefits. Projections of other social 
protection transfers, such as survivors’ and invalidity pensions, unemployment, family-related 
benefits, education-related benefits, and housing and social assistance are also included in the 
modelling framework.  
The results presented in this report show macroeconomic aggregate projections. The baseline 
scenario highlights the rising trend of old-age dependency rates in all countries analysed. The 
exogenous increase in the rates of participation in the labour force, as well as the decrease in 
unemployment, bring about a substantial improvement of employment rates until the 2020s. In 
the following decades, employment growth slows down.  
In spite of the increasing labour productivity growth, the rate of growth of GDP undergoes a 
slight decrease in the countries of the EU15 and a remarkable fall in Poland and Latvia. In the 
ageing context, the increase in social spending is evident in many countries. The increase in 
employment and the recent reforms are at least partially able to offset the rise in public pensions 
expenditure.   
To give robustness to the projections, several sensitivity scenarios are built. They are mainly 
devoted to analysing the role of the main model’s driving forces, which are demographic 
projections and – as far as old-age expenditure is concerned – theoretical replacement rates. In 
addition, the role of an increase in employment – such as the one necessary to fulfil the Lisbon 
targets – is also explored.  38 | 
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Appendix 1. 
Improvements on semi-aggregate modelling 
Although, as already stated, the semi-aggregate approach is based on previous work, and, in 
particular on Soede et al. (2004), many new features have been added to SAM, requiring a 
complete rewriting of the model. 
The structure and working of SAM were described in some detail in Section 3. Below is a list of 
the features already described that are new with respect to previous work. 
Programming features 
-  While in Soede et. al. (2004)  only three wide age classes were considered (the younger, in 
the age-bracket 15-54, the middle aged, aged 55-64, and the elderly, aged 65 or more), 
SAM groups the population in 5-year age classes, in order to allow for a more detailed 
analysis of adequacy of social security. The implementation of 5-year age classes also 
makes the calculation of the flows of new pensioners for each year easier, which was 
partially constrained by the overly wide age classes in Soede et. al. (2004). 
-  SAM allows for the implementation of a matrix containing detailed projections of labour 
market participation rates by gender and age class, while more simplified hypotheses were 
adopted in previous work. 
Projection features 
-  Time horizon was expanded from 2025 to 2050, thus allowing us to capture the peak of the 
number of pensioners occurring in most countries after 2025. 
-  The number of countries was increased from 6 to 10; moreover, they were chosen in order 
to obtain a demographically representative ensemble as well as an overview of different 
welfare regimes. As a consequence Spain, Luxembourg, Latvia and Poland were added to 
the picture. 
-  Endogenous participation rate/exogenous employment rate, for instance for the Lisbon 
scenario.  
-  The economic growth, as well as the interest rates, are corrected to take into account the 
effects of ageing on consumption; those corrections affect in turn the sustainability of the 
social security system, although to a nearly negligible extent.  
-  In the computation of the number of old-age pensions recipients, survival probabilities 
evolve consistently with the demographic projections, whereas they used to be constant at 
their 2004 values.  
Scenarios building 
Additional features have been added, in order to make the scenario-building process more 
flexible, in particular: 
-  Change of consumption habits may be analysed, although in a basic way, by altering the 
age-consumption profiles embedded in the model 
-  Scenarios with different demographic projections  
-  Scenarios with different replacement rates.  
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Appendix 2. 
Main social security simulation models in Europe 
Table A2.1 Main social security simulation models in Europe up to 2003 
Country Model/Author  Main  features  Output 
Belgium 
MALTESE (Federal Planning Bureau) 
http://www.plan.be/nl/events/co000120/perugia.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium/ 
Multistate 
Projections of 
all social 
expenditures 
Denmark 
DREAM 
http://www.dreammodel.dk/english5CEnglish.htm 
(web site) 
http://www.dreammodel.dk/english/intro.asp 
(introduction page in the web site) 
General 
equilibrium 
overlapping 
generations 
model  
Projections of  
pension 
expenditure 
Germany 
CESifo 
http://www.cesifo.de 
Partial 
Equilibrium 
Projections of  
pension 
expenditure 
Greece 
Ministry of Public Finance’s model 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/do
cuments/gr_en.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium 
Projections of 
the insurance 
fund Pension 
System, 
including the 
public sector 
Spain 
Three models (two by the INSS and one by CPE) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/do
cuments/es_en.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Projections of  
pension 
expenditure 
 
Model by the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
http://www.igae.minhac.es/documentos/Ficheros/S
GAPRS-2000-01_Ingles.PDF 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Projections of 
pension 
expenditure 
France 
Model by the « Comité de Politique Economique » 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/do
cuments/fr_fr.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Projections of  
pension 
expenditure 
Austria 
Two coordinated models covering the private sector 
and the civil service scheme 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/do
cuments/a_en.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium   
Projections of 
pension 
expenditure 
Sweden 
Swedish Pension Simulation Model (by the 
National Social Insurance Board, RFV) 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/sage/conference/work_
pres/Swed-pen-mod.ppt 
Partial 
equilibrium 
microsimulation 
Projections of  
pension 
expenditure 
  Ministry of Public Finance’s model (FASIT) 
Static model 
based on the 
Swedish 
National 
Accounts 
Projections of  
public income 
and 
expenditure A SEMI-AGGREGATE MODEL FOR SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS | 43 
 
Country Model/Author  Main  features  Output 
 
Model for retiring incentives by Martene Palme and 
Ingemar Svensson 
http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0184.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium 
representative 
agents 
Simulation of 
the social 
security 
outcome for a 
single 
individual 
Finland 
Model by Central Pension Security Institute (ETK) 
http://www.etk.fi 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/do
cuments/sf_en.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium 
Projections of 
earning related 
pensions 
 
Model by the Social Insurance Institution (KELA) 
http://193.209.217.5/in/internet/english.nsf?Open 
Partial 
equilibrium 
Projections of 
national 
pension 
expenditure 
 
FOG Model (by Lassila-Valkonen for the ETLA) 
http://www.etla.fi/english/research/publications/sea
rchengine/pdf/dp/dp765.pdf (in Appendix 2) 
A-K type, 
general 
equilibrium 
perfect foresight 
numerical 
overlapping 
generations 
Projections of 
pension 
expenditures 
and revenues 
Netherlands 
General Accounting (GA) model (by the 
Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, 
CPB) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/do
cuments/nl_en.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Projections of 
all social 
expenditures 
and revenues 
 
GAMMA model (by the Netherlands Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis, CPB) 
http://www.cpb.nl/eng/cpbreport/2002_4/s3_3.pdf 
Extends the GA 
model to  
general 
equilibrium 
Projections of 
all social 
expenditures 
and revenues 
Portugal 
Model by Pereira and Rodrigues 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/do
cuments/pt_en.pdf 
Actuarial, partial 
equilibrium 
Projections of 
all social 
expenditures 
and revenues 
as a percentage 
of GDP 
Ireland 
Model by the Minister of Finance 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/do
cuments/irl_en.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium  
Integrated 
economic and 
pension 
projections 
United 
Kingdom 
Model by the HM Treasury 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/do
cuments/uk_en.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium 
Separated 
projections of 
all major social 
expenditures  44 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
Country Model/Author  Main  features  Output 
Italy 
INPS Prevision model 
Cinzia Ferrara, “Il modello di previsione 
dell’INPS”, in Le previsioni della spesa per 
pensioni, ISTAT, Annali di statistica, Serie 10, Vol. 
16, pp. 13-22 
Partial 
equilibrium 
multistate 
Projections of 
the main 
elements of 
public pension 
expenditure 
 
Model of the Department of General Accounts 
(RGS) 
http://cerp.unito.it/Forum/downloads/Archivio/april
e_sidoti.pdf 
Partial 
equilibrium 
multistate 
Projections of  
pension 
expenditure 
(including both 
social pensions 
and those paid 
for the 
compulsory 
pension 
system) 
 
MODSIM 
http://www-user.ined.fr/~mad/Rencontres-Sauvy-
Paris/Actes/Baldacci.pdf 
General 
equilibrium  
Projections of 
all social 
expenditures  
 
Venturini: “Un modello per la stima della ricchezza 
pensionistica delle famiglie”, in Le previsioni della 
spesa per pensioni, ISTAT, Annali di statistica, 
Serie 10, Vol. 16, pp. 81-98 
Microsimulation  
Households’ 
Social Security 
Wealth 
 
Cannari and Nicoletti Altimari: “A Dynamic Micro 
Simulation Model of the Italian Households’ 
Sector” in Le previsioni della spesa per pensioni, 
ISTAT, Annali di statistica, Serie 10, Vol. 16, pp. 
103-134 
Microsimulation 
Households’ 
Social Security 
Wealth; 
pension 
expenditure 
projections 
Source: CeRP. | 45 
Appendix 3. 
Consumption profiles and economic growth
12 
In order to enrich the model, we attempted the introduction of feedback effects from population 
ageing to GDP growth, through the effect of ageing on consumption and saving behaviour of 
households.  
More precisely, from estimated age-consumption profiles, the total consumption rate over GDP 
and, in turn, the saving rate can be obtained. The changes in the saving rate induced by ageing 
then affect – through a production function in a Solow-like environment – the steady state levels 
of capital and output per unit of productive labour. Therefore, the dynamics of GDP growth 
(and of interest rate) are modified according to these feedback effects.  
A detailed explanation of these mechanisms is provided in the following section. However, we 
deemed the procedure in appropriate for the purposes of this study and therefore did not use it in 
the projections. Furthermore, the results obtained with and without the more sophisticated 
procedure are very similar and do not justify the use of such a complicated tool. The different 
results are shown in Tables A3.1, A3.2 and A3.3 below.  
The methodology would consist of several steps: 
-  country-specific individual consumption profiles by age are estimated using the SHARE 
dataset 
-  age consumption profiles are applied to the evolving structure of the population 
-  total private consumption over age classes is obtained and its path is calculated throughout 
all the projection period 
-  variations of consumption and of GDP are matched to obtain the evolution of the private 
consumption-GDP ratio. 
The effects of ageing on the economic growth and on the interest rates 
The estimation of private consumption allows us to disentangle the effects that ageing has on 
economic growth and on interest rates through the consumption transmission channel. 
It must be stressed, however, that no behavioural equation is explicitly considered in the model, 
and the variation of consumption is deterministically obtained through the application of the 
age-consumption profile to the evolving age-structure of the population. There is a ‘one-way’ 
process from ageing to consumption, income does not influence consumption. The saving rate is 
jointly determined by the evolution of consumption and the evolution of income; the evolution 
of income, in turn, is affected by the evolution of the saving rate, and, thus, by consumption.  
The procedure we implemented starts from the average saving rate (1-consumption/GDP), 
which results from our age-related average profiles, and links it, through a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, to the steady state value of capital per unit of productive labour, as well as 
to the steady state value of output per unit of productive labour. This means that the variation of 
the saving rate induced by demographic dynamics causes a succession of ‘overlapping 
transitions’ to different steady states; the speed of these transitions is set consistently with 
empirical evidence on the speed of convergence.
13 Since we are more interested in variations 
                                                      
12 This appendix comes, with minor variations, from DG Employment and Social Affairs (2007), and the 
reader should refer to that work for an in-depth explanation of the estimation of the age-consumption 
profiles. 
13 See Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995). 46 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
than absolute values, with a relatively parsimonious parameterisation of the production function, 
based on benchmark values, we may generate an interest rate dynamics induced by ageing, as 
well as a correction of the GDP growth per worker, with respect to the assumed exogenous rate. 
In general, from growth accounting, with a production function exhibiting constant returns to 
scale and labour-augmenting technical progress,  (, ) YF K A L = , the rate of growth of output 
may be written as:
14 
(1 ) ( )
K
gn a n
K
αα =+− + −
&
   (A3.1) 
where g  the wanted rate of growth, n the rate of growth of the employment, a is the rate of 
growth of the technology term A, and α  is the capital share, which is constant if we consider a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. 
According to the Solow framework, on the steady growth path, the rate of growth of capital is 
equal to a+n , consequently, the rate of growth of output may be rewritten as:  gna =+. This 
implies that the rate of growth of output per worker, as well as the rate of growth of capital per 
worker, equal the rate of growth of the labour-augmenting technical progress a.  
Indeed, as we already stated, assuming we are on the steady growth path, we can obtain the rate 
of growth of GDP by summing up the rate of growth of employment, and the rate of growth of 
labour productivity, estimated as output per worker. 
If the saving rate changes continuously, however, we never reach a steady state but, on the 
contrary, experience short intervals of overlapping transitions, each of them driven by a 
different steady state level of capital per unit of productive labour (K/AL). 
Since capital per unit of productive labour varies during transitions, ceteris paribus, the rate of 
growth of capital will no longer be equal to a+n, but a transitional component,  t m ,  is added, 
which will gradually shrink approaching the new steady state; thus equation A3.1 may be 
rewritten as: 
(1 ) ( ) tt gn a a m α α =+− + +    (A3.2) 
The  t m component is the rate of growth of 
K
AL
, which is gradually adjusting to its new steady 
state level. 
Given a Cobb-Douglas production function we can calculate for each period T the new steady 
state level of 
K
AL
 with respect to the first one: 
1/(1 ) *
*
TT
oo
ks
ks
α −
⎛⎞
=⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (A3.3) 
where 
*
i k  represent steady state levels of 
K
AL
 depending on the saving rate s at time i. 
During transitions, the variation   t m  of the capital per unit of productive labour at time t may be 
written as:
15 
                                                      
14 For lengthier explanations see Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995), from p. 346. 
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*
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&
 where  (1 )( ) na β αδ =− ++    (A3.4) 
δ is the depreciation rate of capital, and β indicates the speed of convergence, in terms of the 
fraction that vanishes at each period of the gap between the present level of capital per unit of 
productive labour and its steady state value. 
 
*
T
t
k
k
 may be obtained even without directly knowing the level of capital per unit of productive 
labour, but only the ratios between steady state levels: 
* ** ** *
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    (A3.5) 
In such a way, assuming that k in the first period of our simulation is not too far from the initial 
steady state, we are able to ‘correct’ the growth rate of GDP in order to take into account the 
alteration of consumption induced by population ageing. 
As for the interest rate, unlike the capital stock, we assume it adjusts immediately to its new 
steady state level. 
The rental rate of capital, given by the arbitrage condition,
16 is: 
() tt RP r δ =+    (A3.6) 
Where P is the price, that we assume constant over the projection period, and r is the economy-
wide real interest rate; from A3.6 we can obtain the variation of the interest rate at each time t: 
1
1 () 1
t
ttt
t
R
rrr
R
δ
+
+
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−= + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
   (A3.7) 
Since in competitive markets the rental rate of capital equals its marginal product, assuming our 
usual Cobb Douglas framework, the ratio between two steady state levels of the rental rate may 
be written as: 
1 **
11
**
tt
tt
Rk
Rk
α−
++ ⎛⎞
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⎝⎠
 (A3.8) 
which allows us, finally, to project the variations of the interest rate induced by ageing through 
the consumption ‘channel’. 
Table A3.1 below shows the different results for GDP per capita growth rates with or without 
endogenous feedback from consumption. The computations are done assuming that the income 
share paid to capital (α) is equal to 0.35 and that the depreciation rate of capital (δ) is zero. 
Indeed, the additional variation induced by ageing through the consumption channel is very 
small. Similarly, a comparison of the same growth rates with those of EPC-EC (2005) (Table 
A3.2) reveals modest differences (in most cases about 0,2 percentage point, slightly higher for 
Luxembourg, Poland and Spain).  
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Real interest rates computed with SAM with endogenous feedback from consumption are 
displayed in Table A3.3. The same interest rates without the feedback effect would have been 
equal to 2% in all countries and for the whole period. In EPC-EC (2005) real interest rates are 
assumed to be equal to 3% in all countries and periods.  
Table A3.1 GDP per capita growth rates  
 
Without endogenous feedback from 
consumption 
With endogenous feedback from 
consumption 
  2004-10 2011-30 2031-50 2004-10 2011-30 2031-50 
Denmark    2.0 1.5 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.6 
France  1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 
Germany    1.8 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.3 1.4 
Italy    1.6 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.1 
Latvia    8.5 3.9 1.5 8.4 4.0 1.5 
Luxembourg    2.2 1.6 1.6 2.2 1.6 1.5 
Netherlands    1.3 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.6 
Poland    6.0 3.4 1.3 6.0 3.6 1.4 
Spain    2.4 1.8 0.9 2.5 1.9 0.9 
United  Kingdom    2.5 1.8 1.5 2.5 1.7 1.3 
Source: our calculations (SAM), baseline scenario.  
Table A3.2 GDP per capita growth rates, period averages  
  2004-10 2011-30 2031-50 
Denmark    1.8 1.5 1.7 
France    1.7 1.5 1.6 
Germany    1.6 1.4 1.5 
Italy    1.6 1.6 1.3 
Latvia    8.3 3.9 1.5 
Luxembourg    3.1 2.1 2.4 
Netherlands    1.3 1.3 1.7 
Poland    4.7 3.4 1.3 
Spain    2.0 1.9 0.9 
United Kingdom   2.4  1.8  1.5 
Source: EPC-EC, 2005. 
Table A3.3 Real interest rates  
  2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Denmark    2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 
France  2.0 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.6 
Germany    2.0 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.5 
Italy    2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.6 
Latvia    2.2 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.5 
Luxembourg    2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 
Netherlands    2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Poland    2.1 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 
Spain    2.0 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 
United  Kingdom    2.1 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.1 
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Appendix 4. Replacement rates from ISG-SPC (2006) 
Table A4.1 Denmark 
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of 
avg  
Earnings 
from 100% 
to 200% of 
avg  
Broken 
career 
  2005 2050 2005  2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Gross RR 
1st pillar   45.1 39.2 67.7 62.5  43  37.3 37.6 32.7 22.6 17.8 43.6  41 
Gross RR 
2nd pillar   3.6 24.8 3.6 24.8 3.6 23.6 3.5 20.6 3.4 18.4 3.6 18.6 
Total 
gross RR   48.7  64  71.3 87.3 46.6 60.9 41.1 53.2  26  36.2 47.2 59.7 
Total net 
RR   71.3 76.1 97.6 101.8 68.5 72.9 61.5 65.1 44.5  51  70  71.5 
 
Table A4.2 Germany  
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of 
avg  
Earnings 
from 100% 
to 200% of 
avg  
Broken 
career 
  2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Gross RR 
1st pillar  43  34 43.3 33.8 41.2 32.2 36.1 28.2 32.5 25.4 34.6 31.6 
Gross RR 
2nd pillar  0  15  0 14.5  0 13.7  0 11.9  0 10.3  0 12.3 
Total 
gross RR  43  48 43.3 48.3 41.2 45.9 36.1 40.1 32.5 35.7 34.6 43.9 
Total net 
RR  63  67 57.4 66.7 61.2 64.3 55.5 57.8 56.4 49.6 50.8 61.6 
 
Table A4.3 Spain 
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of avg 
Earnings 
from 100% to 
200% of avg  
Broken career
 2005  2050  2005  2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050  2005  2050
Gross RR 
1st pillar  90.5 85.3 90.5 85.3 90.2 85.1 84.9 80.1 71.2 62.2 81.5 76.8
Gross RR 
2nd pillar  - - - - - - - - - - - -
Total 
gross RR  90.5 85.3 90.5 85.3 90.2 85.1 84.9 80.1 71.2 62.2 81.5 76.8
Total net 
RR  97.2 91.6 97.1 91.6 96.8 91.3 91.7 86.6 78.8 70.6 88.6 82.450 | FERRARESI & MONTICONE 
 
Table A4.4 France 
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of avg 
Earnings 
from 100% 
to 200% of 
avg  
Broken 
career 
  2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Gross RR 
1st pillar  66.2 49.3 65.8 49.2 65.2 48.5 58.5  43 48.3 32.4 51.1 35.4 
Gross RR 
2nd pillar  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 
gross RR  66.2 49.3 65.9 49.2 65.2 48.5 58.5  43 48.3 32.4 51.1 35.4 
Total net 
RR  79.7 62.6 81.2 61.7 78.8 61.7 71.7 55.6 60.6 43.6 63.9 46.7 
 
Table A4.5 Italy 
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of 
avg  
Earnings 
from 100% 
to 200% of 
avg  
Broken 
career 
  2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Gross RR 
1st pillar  78.9 64.1 78.9 64.1 78.9 61.2 77.1 53.7 73.1 48.4  na  na 
Gross RR 
2nd pillar  0 15.5  0 15.5  0 14.8  0 12.9  0 11.5  na  na 
Total gross 
RR  78.9 79.7 78.9 79.7 78.9  76 77.1 66.5 73.1  60  na  na 
Total net 
RR  87.8  92 88.1  92 87.7 88.1 85.9 78.3 83.1 74.5  na  na 
 
Table A4.6 Latvia 
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of 
avg  
Earnings 
from 100% 
to 200% of 
avg  
Broken 
career 
  2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Gross RR 
1st pillar  60.8 54.5 64.6 54.5 60.8 51.1 60.8 50.3 60.8  43 45.4 39.8 
Gross RR 
2nd pillar  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Total 
gross RR  60.8 54.5 64.6 54.5 60.8 51.1 60.8 50.3 60.8  43 45.4 39.8 
Total net 
RR  77.6 71.8 80.3 71.4 77.6 67.3 78.2 66.4 79.3  57 57.9 52.4 
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Table A4.7 Luxembourg 
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of avg 
Earnings 
from 100% to 
200% of avg  
Broken 
career 
  2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050
Gross RR 
1st pillar  90.8 90.7 97.5 97.3 86.5 86.4 75.7 75.6 65.1 65 52.9 52.8
Gross RR 
2nd pillar  0  0  0  0000000  0  0
Total gross 
RR  90.8 90.7 97.5 97.3 86.5 86.4 75.7 75.6 65.1 65 52.9 52.8
Total net 
RR  98.3 98.8  107.4  107.1 94.8 95.3 86.4 86.2 74.1 74 63.5 63.8
 
Table A4.8 Netherlands 
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of 
avg  
Earnings 
from 100% 
to 200% of 
avg  
Broken 
career 
  2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Gross RR 
1st pillar  29.6 29.6 44.4 44.4 28.2 28.2 24.6 24.6 14.8 14.8 29.6 29.6 
Gross RR 
2nd pillar  41.6 45.2 26.4 31.8  43 43.2  46  38 55.8 41.1 31.2 33.9 
Total gross 
RR  71.1 74.8 70.8 76.2 71.2 71.3 70.7 62.7 70.6 55.9 60.8 63.5 
Total net 
RR  92.9 97.3 87.9 93.6 93.5 93.9 91.7 84.9 93.6 77.9  81 84.3 
 
Table A4.9 Poland 
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of avg 
Earnings 
from 100% 
to 200% of 
avg  
Broken 
career 
  2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050
Gross RR 
1st pillar  63.2 35.7 63.2 38.7 61.9 33.9 60.4 29.7 59.5 26.8 55.9 26.8
Gross RR 
2nd pillar  - - - - - - - - - - - -
Total gross 
RR  63.2 35.7 63.2 38.7 61.9 33.9 60.4 29.7 59.5 26.8 55.9 26.8
Total net 
RR  77.7 43.9 77.7 43.8 76.1 41.7 74.7 36.6 73.2 33 68.7 32.9
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Table A4.10 United Kingdom  
 
100% of 
average 
earnings  
2/3 of avg 
earnings  
Concave 
earning 
profile  
Earnings 
from 80% to 
120% of 
avg  
Earnings 
from 100% 
to 200% of 
avg  
Broken 
career 
 
  2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 
Gross RR 
1st pillar  17 19 25 28 16 18 14 16  8 10 17 21 
Gross RR 
2nd pillar  50 50 49 50  0.5 50 50 50 50 50 33 33 
Total gross 
RR  66 69 74 78 65 68 63 66 58 60 50 54 
Total net 
RR  82 85 91 95 81 84 78 81 71 73 64 69 
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Appendix 5. Survival probabilities 
These two tables compare the number of pensioners computed with ‘evolving’ and constant 
survival probabilities. As expected, the use of projected survival rates brings an additional 
ageing component to the picture, thus increasing the number of pensioners both in absolute 
values and in relation to the elderly population (65+).   
Table A5.1 Number of pensioners 
 2005  2010 2020 2030 2040  2050
With ‘evolving’ life tables         
Denmark   935,993  1,003,167 1,165,169 1,343,133 1,421,852  1,357,851
France 12,029,163  12,439,556 14,008,507 15,735,990 17,180,942 17,637,111
Germany   18,053,229  17,463,196 18,078,243 21,185,359 22,353,584 21,898,156
Italy   12,582,143  12,471,519 12,864,800 14,579,860 16,581,518 16,723,306
Latvia   378,072  368,809 381,803 425,065 460,189  501,326
Luxembourg   46,595  50,327 65,066 89,300 105,464  113,923
Netherlands   2,553,552  2,573,136 2,879,469 3,473,859 3,708,485  3,604,675
Poland   5,514,220  5,332,118 6,017,548 6,715,790 7,673,219  8,676,657
Spain   5,040,000  5,190,614 6,094,984 8,298,718 11,038,222  12,187,115
United Kingdom   12,541,672  12,764,616 13,922,541 16,005,685 17,271,397 17,929,041
    
With constant life tables     
Denmark   935,993  985,918 1,091,105 1,198,393 1,223,462  1,124,287
France 12,029,163  12,053,998 12,811,462 13,559,440 14,111,389 14,052,198
Germany   18,053,229  16,960,387 16,388,271 18,188,577 18,283,864 17,059,507
Italy   12,582,143  12,156,041 11,877,633 12,787,273 13,999,259 13,443,696
Latvia   378,072  357,340 345,738 359,691 363,014  374,862
Luxembourg   46,595  47,980 58,419 77,198 86,863  89,319
Netherlands   2,553,552  2,523,165 2,714,881 3,127,777 3,282,033  3,129,133
Poland   5,514,220  5,167,679 5,464,138 5,636,490 6,079,756  6,726,065
Spain   5,040,000  5,020,590 5,567,102 7,322,412 9,551,683  10,143,960
United Kingdom   12,541,672  12,412,510 12,705,019 13,754,907 14,156,360 14,155,173
Source: our calculations (SAM) – baseline variant. 
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Table A5.2 Ratio of total pensioners over the population aged 65+   
 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040  2050
With “evolving” life tables        
Denmark   115% 113% 106% 106% 104%  104%
France 121% 120% 107% 100% 97%  98%
Germany   118% 103% 97% 95% 92%  93%
Italy   111% 104% 95% 93% 90%  90%
Latvia   99% 95% 98% 99% 101%  103%
Luxembourg   72% 72% 76% 79% 78%  80%
Netherlands   112% 103% 89% 88% 85%  88%
Poland   110% 105% 89% 81% 88%  88%
Spain   70% 67% 68% 74% 79%  80%
United Kingdom   130% 126% 114% 108% 103%  105%
   
With constant life tables     
Denmark   115% 111% 99% 95% 89%  86%
France 121% 117% 98% 86% 80%  78%
Germany   118% 100% 88% 82% 75%  72%
Italy   111% 101% 87% 81% 76%  72%
Latvia   99% 92% 89% 84% 79%  77%
Luxembourg   72% 69% 68% 69% 64%  63%
Netherlands   112% 101% 84% 79% 76%  77%
Poland   110% 101% 81% 68% 69%  68%
Spain   70% 65% 62% 65% 69%  66%
United Kingdom   130% 122% 104% 93% 84%  83%
Source: our calculations (SAM) – baseline variant. About AIM (Adequacy & Sustainability of Old-Age Income Maintenance) 
he AIM project aims at providing a strengthened conceptual and scientific basis for assessing 
the capacity of European pension systems to deliver adequate old age income maintenance in a 
context of low fertility and steadily increasing life expectancy. The main focus is on the 
capacity of social security systems to contribute to preventing poverty among the old and elderly and 
more generally to enable persons to take all appropriate measures to ensure stable or “desired” 
distribution of income over the full life cycle. In addition it will explore and examine the capacity of 
pension systems to attain broad social objectives with respect to inter- and intra generational 
solidarity. 
Furthermore it will examine the capacity of pension systems to allow workers to change job or to 
move temporarily out of the labour market and to adapt career patterns without losing vesting of 
pensions rights. The project will also address the specific challenges with respect to providing 
appropriate old age income for women. 
A general objective of the research project is to clearly identify and analyse the potential trade-offs 
between certain social policy objectives and overall stability of public debt.  
AIM is financed under the 6th EU Research Framework Programme. It started in May 2005 and 
includes partners from both the old and new EU member states. 
Participating institutes 
•  Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS, Belgium, coordinator  
•  Federal Planning Bureau, FPB, Belgium  
•  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschafsforschung (German Institute for Economic Research), DIW, 
Germany  
•  Elinkeinoelämän tutkimuslaitos, (Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), ETLA, Finland  
•  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada , FEDEA, Spain  
•  Social and Cultural Planning Office, SCP, Netherlands 
•  Instituto di Studi e Analisi Economica (Institute for Studies and Economic Analysis), ISAE, Italy  
•  National Institute for Economic and Social Research, NIESR, United Kingdom  
•  Centrum Analiz Spolleczno-Ekonomicznych (Center for Social and Economic Research), CASE, 
Poland  
•  Tarsadalomkutatasi Informatikai Egyesules (TARKI Social Research Informatics Centre), TARKI, 
Hungary  
•  Centre for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, CeRP, Italy  
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